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PROMETHEUS REBOUND' BY THE
DEVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY:2
THE RESURRECTION OF THE
CHAIN GANG
The clanking of chains on a person's body is an ominous and
incongruous sound in a country that was born amid the music

of a Liberty Bell.
Americans frightened by an increase in crime 4 have urged
elected officials to adopt "tough-on-crime" platforms that empha1 See AEsCHYLus, Prometheus Bound, in 1 GREEK TRAGEDIES 62, 65-105 (David Green &
Richmond Lattimore eds., David Green trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1960) (telling story of
Titan Prometheus chained to boulder endlessly to be tormented by vultures); PERCY
BYSSHE SHELLEY, Prometheus Unbound, in SELECTED POETRY AND PROSE 299, 304 (Kenneth
Neill Cameron ed., Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1951) (noting Prometheus's liberation and
reunion with humanity); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 941 (9th ed. 1983)
(defining Prometheus as "a Titan who is chained and tortured by Zeus for stealing fire from
heaven and giving it to man"). As his punishment, Prometheus was chained to a desert
boulder while vultures ate his liver each day and it was regenerated each night, so the
vultures could torture him again the following day. Id.
2 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363-64 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing standards of decency in evaluating prisons); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1957). What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment may be determined in accordance
with "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id.;
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (indicating Eighth Amendment is not
easily defined, but "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity
and decency are useful and usable"); M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398,
404 (D. Mass. 1978) ("Penal measures are to be evaluated against 'broad and idealistic
concepts of decency.'") (citation omitted); see also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
329 (9th ed. 1983) (defining decency as "conformity to standards of taste, propriety, or
quality").
3 Commonwealth v. Baldi, 106 A.2d 777, 781 (Pa. 1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (expounding on disgrace of chain gangs).
4 See Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on National Drug Control Policy,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, indicating heightened public fear over increasing crime rate is federal priority); see also Mark W. Owens, California's Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require
DesperateMeasures-But Will it Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881, 881-82 (1995) (indicating public
fear resulting from increased media coverage of violent crimes); Dick Thornburgh, Doing
What's Necessary to Fight Crime, 17 PA. LAW. 12, 14-15 (1995) (reporting former United
States Attorney General's suggestion that practical application of campaign anti-crime
campaign rhetoric parallels predominant social concern); Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak, Wave of Fear:America's Soaring Concern Over Crime, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al
[hereinafter Wave of Fear] (noting individual fears of Americans); Steven Braun and Judy
Pasternak, A Nation With Peril on Its Mind, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al [hereinafter
Perilon Its Mind] (suggesting that perception of increased crime is result of local crime and
media focus on violence). But see Nkechi Taifa, The Crime Bill: A Civil Liberties Perspective, 8 NAT'L B. Ass'N MAG. 8 (1994) (noting national crime bill poses civil liberties
concerns).
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size deterrence over rehabilitation. 5 Legislators have responded
by reinstating capital punishment, 6 enacting "no-frills" prison
bills 7 and supporting stricter sexual recidivist statutes.8 Recently,
5 See Paul Johnson, Crime: The People Want Revenge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1994, at A10
(stating "[wihat makes democracy real is a working system that translates the reasonable
wishes of the mass of the people into actual performance of government"); see also Christopher McEntee, Trends in the Region, Mississippi Bonds Will Endure Campaign, BOND
BUYER, Aug. 31, 1995, at 10 (suggesting getting tough on crime is necessary political platform by noting both Democratic and Republican candidates are claiming they will be tough
on crime); Dan Morrison, Death Wish, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 26, 1996, at A3 (quoting
New York Lieutenant Governor Betsy McCaughey as "having no sympathy for that woman
[who killed her 6 year old daughter]" and, "[elven if she's crazy she should die"); Norm
Parish, Link to Slavery Chain Gangs Inhumane and Offensive, Critics Charge, Aniz. REP.,
May 29, 1995, at Al (noting conservatives and Republicans are making crime partisan
issue); G.W. Poindexter, Republicans Say They Have Answers to Subcommittee's Questions,
Assoc. PRESS POL. SERV., Aug. 28, 1995 (stating Governor George Allen was elected on
tough crime platform); Running for Office, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Aug. 31, 1995, at 8A (noting re-election campaign promise to "push for effective crime prevention programs and
tough penalties for career criminals"); Carl Weiser, Getting Tough With Criminals Cuts
Crime, Study Finds, GANNETr NEWS SERV., Nov. 3, 1994 (indicating stricter treatment of
criminals makes politicians popular). But see Comment: A View from the Inside, ARiz.
DAILY STAR,Aug. 18, 1995, at A18 (suggesting politicians claiming to be tough on crime are
counterproductive).
6 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 278, § 33E (West 1995) (reinstating death penalty in
Massachusetts); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 650-62 (McKinney 1995) (reinstating capital punishment in New York effective September 1, 1995); see also Kevin Cullen, The New Freedom Riders, BOSTON GLOBE, June 25, 1995, at 16 (noting Pennsylvania Governor Weld said
his campaign to bring back death penalty was "response to a 'moral consensus' that death
is an appropriate punishment for some crimes"); Jay Gallagher, Pataki Signs Death Penalty Bill, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Mar. 7, 1995 (noting New York Governor Pataki fulfilled
campaign promise by signing death penalty bill into law, making New York 38th state to
restore capital punishment). See generally Ronald J. Tabak, Are Executions in New York
Inevitable?, 22 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 557, 557-58 (1995) (discussing whether law enacted in
New York reinstating capital punishment will survive constitutional scrutiny).
7 E.g., H.R. REP. No. 663, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing Representative Zimmer's amendment to Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent
luxurious prison conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitting
Representative Pryce's plan to prevent federal prisoners from strengthening their ability to
fight); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601 (West 1994) (noting prison administration authority not
limited to restrict privileges); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-196.3 (1995) (outlining "Credits Against
the Service of Sentences and for Attainment of Prison Privileges" in Article 19A); see also
Joe Hallinan, Return to 'No-Frills'Prisonis the Latest Rage, Hous. CHRON.,Aug. 6, 1995, at
7 (noting lawmakers are seeking return to "no frills" prisons); Iver Peterson, Cutting Down
on Amenities to Achieve No-Frills Jails, N.Y. TnrsEs, July 10, 1995, at B7 [hereinafter Cutting Down on Amenities] (noting three New Jersey county jails have begun to charge inmates for medications); Iver Peterson, Researchers Divided Over Whether No-FrillsPrisons
Work, Hous. CHRON., July 16, 1995, at 12 [hereinafter Researchers Divided] (discussing
anti-crime mood has led to "crackdown on the amenities and free services" inmates
receive).

8 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:7-6 (West 1995) ("Notification of community of intent of
sex offender released from correctional facility or adjudicated delinquent to reside in municipality.") ("Megan's Law") (enacted October 31, 1994, providing public notification provisions for repeated sex offenders); 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3 §§ 1401-06 (permitting police to
notify communities about sex offenders living nearby when necessary for public protection);
see Michelle P. Jerusalem, A Framework for Post-Sentence Sex Offender Legislation: Perspectives on Prevention, Registration, and the Public's "Right"to Know, 48 VAND. L. REV.
219, 221 (1995) (indicating angry parents insisted on legislative change to prevent sexual
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legislators at every level have campaigned successfully on strong
anti-crime platforms. 9 The anti-crime climate that led to the election of conservatives and the enactment of no-frills prison measures, also led to the reconsideration of chain gang sentences. 1°
Chain gangs are comprised generally of prison inmates chained
individually or to each other in small groups, assigned to off-site
road work." Americans have expressed widespread approval of

offenders from repeating offenses); Ivette Mendez, Sex Offender Legislation Gains in the
Senate, STAR LEDGER (N.J.), Aug. 23, 1995, at 1 (reporting public support of legislation to
prevent sexual recidivism). But see Artway v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 876 F. Supp. 666, 671,
687-88, 692 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding public notification provisions of Megan's Law unconstitutional). See generally CriminalLaw, Sex Offender NotificationStatute, Washington State
Community Protection Act Serves as Model for Other Initiatives by Lawmakers and Communities, 108 HARV. L. REV. 787, 787 (1995) (noting modern trend in state and federal
legislation to notify community of sex offenders living in their neighborhood).
9 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (1994) (outlining mandatory sentencing guidelines upon
fourth felony offense); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (Michie 1994) (outlining mandatory life
imprisonment for three violent felony convictions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (Law. Co-op.
1995) (outlining life sentence for prisoner convicted three times for delineated crimes);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (1995) ("three strikes" statute); see Brent Staples, The Chain
Gang Show, HumiliatingPrisonersfor PoliticalProfit, N.Y. TnAEs, Sept. 17, 1995, (Magazine), at 62 (criticizing politically-motivated spectacle of chain gang); 48 Hours (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 22, 1995) (discussing preference for stricter criminal penalties leading
to reconsideration of chain gangs).
10 See Peer Baker, Allen Offers Plan to Abolish Parole,WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1994, at Al
(suggesting increased fear of crime led to more conservative legislation); Dan Balz and
Helen Dewar, Disillusioned Public Puts Social Issues at Top of Fall Campaigns, WASH.
POST, Oct. 2, 1994, at Al (comparing impact of crime-related issues on 1992 and 1994 elections); Robert Worth, A Model Prison,ATLANTic MONTHLY, Nov. 1995, at 38 (reporting on
popularity of no-frills prison and Alabama chain gang as responses to crime-related fears);
supra notes 6 and 7 (noting state legislators who re-enacted death penalty and no-frills
prison reforms fulfilling campaign promises). This shift can also be seen in the revival of
the death penalty in a majority of states and stricter sentencing statutes. Id.; see also
Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and You're Out"--Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third
Time Felons, 20 DAYTON L. REV. 717, 717-19, 721 (1995) (discussing federal mandatory life
sentences without parole upon third violent offense conviction and analogizing state recidivist statutes).
11 See Stephen Bates, USA: Ghosts of Old South Rattle Chains, GUARDIAN (London), May
20, 1995, at 23 (reporting composition of chain gangs); Michael Dorman, On the Chain
Gang, NEWSDAY (New York), June 18, 1995, at A7 (detailing chain gang elements); Mireya
Navarro, Floridato Resume Chain Gangs; Rules on Shackles Are Criticized, N.Y. Tnvfis,
Nov. 21, 1995, at A12 (noting enhanced safety of individual chaining method); Officials
QuarrelAbout Enforcing Chain Gang Law The Doc Chief Says He Won't Chain Prisoners
Together. The Law's Sponsor Says He Has To, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 22, 1995, at C5
(discussing pros and cons of different chaining methods); Telephone Interview with Tom
Gilkeson, Public Relations and Research, Alabama Dept. of Corrections [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Tom Gilkeson] (Sept. 14, 1995).
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the reemergence of chain gangs. 1 2 Reinstatement of this mode of
punishment, however, evokes Eighth Amendment concerns.13
The United States Supreme Court consistently has acknowledged a broad and flexible standard of decency as the foundation
of the Eighth Amendment. 1 4 Nevertheless, the Court has developed a narrow practical standard that is increasingly difficult for
12 See Richard Lacayo, The Real Hard Cell: Lawmakers are Stripping Inmates of Their
Perks, TIME, Sept. 4, 1995, at 31 (noting Americans are "fed up" with crime and looking to
impose mild forms of torture). In a recent Time/CNN poll, 65% of those questioned approved use of chain gangs. Id.; Poll:Arizonans Back Chain Gangs More Than 75+ Approve
of the Reinstitutionof the Procedure,TucsoN CrrizEN, May 26, 1995, at 2C (reporting threefourths of state's registered voters approved reinstituting of chain gangs); Shackles of
Shame, ST. Louis DISPATCH, May 13, 1995, at 14B [hereinafter Shackles of Shame] (stating
that "sounds of the men working on the chain gang are drowned out by the clinking of their
chains and the public's roar of approval"). Contra 48 Hours (CBS television broadcast,
June 22, 1995) (reporting Alabama Representative John Knight's discussion of district poll
opposing chain gangs).
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
Id.; Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (M.D. Ala. filed Sept. 19, 1995) (Second Amended
Complaint at 1) (instituting class action by prison inmates, asserting chain gang violates
Eighth Amendment); Thomas B. Edsall, The Nation: Major GOP Victories Continue Year's
Trend, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1993, at Al (discussing Republican political victories as part of
conservative trend and indicating Republican leaders will focus on crime); Thomas B. Edsall, Republicans Offer Mixed Forecastfor 1994, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1993, at A8 (contrasting Republican and Democratic strategies in view of recent Republican political victories);
Nation Briefs, CHI. SUN-TuIES, May 9, 1995, at 26 (noting inmate filed suit against Alabama Governor Fob James claiming working on state's new chain gang violates Eighth and
Thirteenth Amendments); Steve Yozwiak, Arizona Chain Gangs Planned by Symington,
Amxz REP., May 6, 1995, at B1 (indicating chain gangs may violate Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). See generally Kenneth Shuster, Halacha As A Model For American Penal Practice:A Comparison of Halachic and American
Punishment Methods, 19 NOVA L. REV. 965, 993-94 (1995) (discussing scope of Eighth
Amendment).
14 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (citing tradition of cases declaring Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause "draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society [with] few absolute limitations");
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1014 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (explaining historical proportionality standards of evaluating punishments in accordance with "evolving standards of decency"); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 308 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (reviewing developing standards for assessing constitutionality of confinement conditions);
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (discussing philosophical foundation of
Eighth Amendment analysis); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (tracing common development and expansion of Eighth Amendment interpretation); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668 n.36 (1977) (noting tradition of Supreme Court decisions concerning Eighth Amendment refer to "evolving standards of decency [not] fastened to the
obsolete"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (noting progressive scope of Eighth
Amendment proscribing barbaric uncivilized and disproportionate physical punishment);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (explaining tradition of interpreting Eighth
Amendment "in flexible and dynamic manner"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241
(Douglas, J., concurring), 329 (Marshall, J., concurring), 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(1972) (describing due process application of Eighth Amendment according to progressive
notions of decency); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202 (1971) (noting American
penal system comports with progressive conscience of community); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510, 520 n.15 (1968) (stating "one of the most important functions any jury can
perform... is to maintain a link between contemporary values and the penal system").
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an aggrieved prisoner to establish. 1 5 By international norms, 16
this narrowing standard is in conflict with the Eighth Amendment's presumption of "progressively evolving standards of decency" 7 and humanity. 8 However, current Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence eschews this international, philosophical foundation. 9 In this context, the Court has noted its obligation to identify rather than establish societal mores. 20 Thus, what otherwise
would be "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth
Amendment may yield to a less tolerant society that is reshaping
21
its notions of isolationism, cruelty and punitive goals.
15 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (stating that
"ultimate result of today's decision, I fear, is that 'serious deprivations of basic human
needs' will go unredressed due to an unnecessary and meaningless search for 'deliberate
indifference'") (citation omitted); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 329-30 (1986) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (stating that "'unnecessary and wanton' standard ... establishes a high
hurdle to be overcome by a prisoner seeking relief for a constitutional violation"); see also
Irving Joyner, LitigatingPolice Misconduct Claims in North Carolina, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J.
113, 122 (1991) (indicating cruel and unusual standard is difficult one to meet); Ian M.
Ogilvie, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The Ninth CircuitAnalyzes PrisonSecurity Policy With "DeliberateIndifference" to PenologicalNeeds in Jordan v. Gardner, 68
ST. JoHN's L. REV.259, 259 (1994) (suggesting standard of proving deliberate indifference
is difficult hurdle in prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims); JoAnne A. Pierce, Comment,
ConstitutionalLaw, Eighth Amendment ProportionalityAnalysis of Terms for Years Uncertain, Harmelin v. Michigan, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 210, 213 (1992) (indicating Supreme
Court looks to society's "evolving standards of decency" to evaluate Eighth Amendment
claims, which is difficult concept to define); Doretha M. Van Slyke, Note, Hudson v. McMillian and Prisoner'sRights: The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1727, 1728 (1993) (suggesting Supreme Court makes upholding prisoner's rights increasingly difficult by creating legal barriers to Eighth Amendment claims through high standards of proof).
16 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (citing United Nations surveys and international practices); HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, WORLD REPORT 313 (1995) (noting Congressional
crime bill expected to worsen United States prison problems); HuMAN RiGwrs WATCH,
WORLD REPORT 343 (1994) (noting United States prisons violated International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights which required that prisoners "be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person").
17 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (asserting Eighth Amendment parameters are determined
by "evolving standards of decency that mark a maturing society").
18 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189,200 (1989) (indicating that when state restrains prisoner so that he is not self-sufficient, Eighth Amendment requires provision of basic human necessities such as food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (noting Eighth
Amendment serves as primary source of substantive protection in cases where deliberate
use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 369 (1910) (stating Eighth Amendment "expresses a great deal of humanity").
19 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,368 n.1 (1989) (rejecting expressly any consideration of international practices).
20 Id. at 378 (affirming role of judiciary to determine societal norms, not set them).
21 See WEsT's ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODE Election Results (West 1995) (indicating approval of Proposition 187 "Illegal Aliens. Ineligibility for Public Services. Verification and
Reporting"); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66010.8 (West Supp. 1995) ("Exclusion of Illegal Aliens
from Public Postsecondary Educational Institutions."); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130
(West Supp. 1995) ("Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Publicly Funded Health Care."); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West Supp. 1995) ("Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from Public

226

ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:221

Although the Supreme Court has addressed confinement conditions 22 as well as individual elements of chain gangs,2 3 it has
never explicitly addressed whether the chain gang concept itself
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 24 Nevertheless, established safeguards and constitutional requirements, combined with
the narrowing interpretation and application of the Eighth
Amendment, may be sufficient to ensure that the new chain gangs
to survive constitutional challenge.
This Note examines the chain gang and its prior abolition due to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. It will discuss
whether its return is a devolution contrary to the underlying
Social Services."); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 (N.D. Ga.), (holding work
camps are not unconstitutional per se, but prisoner may raise "question of his own particular treatment as being a violation of his constitutional rights") affd, 393 U.S. 266 (1968) ;
John Harwood, Center Stage: Racially Tinged Issues Dominate the Debate as Campaigns
Unfold, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1995, at Al (discussing California Governor Pete Wilson's
presidential campaign which stresses curtailing illegal immigration). See generally Laura
Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A Violation of an Emerging
Rule of Customary InternationalLaw, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 161, 166, 187-88, 205 (1990)
(noting international underpinnings of Eighth Amendment analysis); Martin A. Rogoff, InternationalPolitics and the Rule of Law: The United States and The InternationalCourt of
Justice, 7 B.U. Irr'L L.J. 267, 292-93 (1989) (discussing role of United States in international community); Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis.
L. REV. 965, 1015 (noting risks of global isolationism); Robert J. Shulman, Comment, Children of a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth Amendment Be Altered or Repealed to Deny
Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to American Born Children of Illegal Aliens,
22 PEPP. L. REV. 669, 673-74, 710-21 (1995) (discussing ramifications of legislation such as
California's Proposition 187); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the
Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1020 (1995)
(stressing importance of cultural integration).
22 See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995) (noting Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from unconstitutional state action "even within expected conditions of confinement"); Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1974 (1994) (holding inhumane conditions
of confinement subject to Eighth Amendment where "substantial risk of serious harm" is
known and disregarded); Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2479-80 (1993) (stating
future health risks caused by prison conditions subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny);
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (deciding excessive force without inflicting serious injury is unconstitutional condition of confinement); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 52932 (1979) (holding double-bunking is not unconstitutional confinement condition but prison
conditions must provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1979) (stating inadequate nutrition, overcrowding, prison violence, and untrained supervision is unconstitutional confinement); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating failure to provide medical care is
impermissible result of imprisonment).
23 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 (permitting restraints reasonably related to prison security);
Wilson, 294 F. Supp. at 1013 (holding work camps are not per se unconstitutional), aftd,
393 U.S. 266 (1968).
24 See McLamore v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 934, 934 (1972) (involving sentence of
chain gang assignment). The petition for certiorari sought review of, among other things,
whether the chain gang was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. Id. Justice Douglas urged that the Court grant certiorari to consider whether
"the chain gang fit[s] into our current concept of penology" and whether it contradicts prior
enunciated principles of the Court. Id. at 935.
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spirit of the Eighth Amendment. Part One traces the history of
chain gangs in America and discusses the reasons for their abandonment. Part Two describes the political climate that has led to
the revival of chain gangs. It will describe modifications in the
administration of chain gangs specifically designed to withstand
constitutional attack. Part Three discusses the tension between
the philosophical underpinnings of the Eighth Amendment and its
practical application by the Supreme Court. This Note will conclude that although the chain gang violates the traditional philosophy of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it is unlikely that
either its individual components or the aggregation of its elements
will be found unconstitutional under the Court's current narrow,
practical analysis.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE CHAIN GANG

The American chain gang has predominantly southern roots.25
The poor economic and labor conditions of the South following the
Civil War enhanced the attractiveness of convict road work.2 6 The
chain gang was seen as a solution to the existing economic and
labor strife2 7 while fulfilling the penal goals of retribution and
deterrence.28
Historically, chain gangs were criticized as disproportionately
severe punishment for relatively minor offenses. 2 9 Additionally,
25 See JESSE F. STEINER & Roy M. BROWN, THE NORTH CAROLINA CHAIN GANG 1, 4, 12
(Patterson Smith 1969) (1927) (discussing Southern origins of chain gang); Malcolm M.
Feeley et al., Between Two Extremes: An Examination of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of
Community Service Ordersand Their Implicationsfor the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 155, 156 (1992) (indicating rise of chain gangs in post Civil War South); Paul
Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 101 (1985) (suggesting
chain gangs add to image of violence in American South); John V. Orth, North Carolina
ConstitutionalHistory, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1783 (1992) (noting chain gangs were feature
of Southern landscape).
26 See STEINR & BROWN, supra note 25, at 12 (noting Civil War resulted in higher crime
rate and new punishments).
27 Id. at 5, 102-24 (discussing economic goals of road crews); see Carracter v. Morgan,
491 F.2d 458, 458 (4th Cir. 1973) (alleging racial discrimination in operation of South Carolina chain gang); Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir.) (releasing fugitive of Georgia chain
gang from extradition because of cruel and unusual treatment by correctional officers),
rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
2 STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 6 (noting humiliation and disgrace of chain gang
sentence as opposed to imprisonment).
29 See Boswell v. Barnhart, 23 S.E. 414 (Ga. 1895). The widow of a man sentenced to a
chain gang for a misdemeanor alleged that he died due to "cruel treatment, exposure, neglect, and excessive and unreasonable tasks." Id; Dorothy T. Beasley, The Georgia Bill of
Rights: Dead or Alive?, 34 EMORY L.J. 341, 402 (1995) (suggesting prisoners were mistreated while working on chain gang); Douglas Dennis, Foreword:A Consumer'sReport, 14
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labor unions opposed "convict leasing," whereby prisoners were
temporarily assigned to another prison or state public works
agency to complete projects, in exchange for which the transferring prison collected a fee. 30 The chain gang was also challenged
as involuntary servitude violating the Thirteenth Amendment. 3
Ultimately, however, insufficient funding3 2 and inexperienced supervision 33 led to abominable conditions of confinement that violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) (indicating that early 1900s were marked by
deplorable conditions of confinement within prison systems such as chain gangs, corporal
punishment, and even death); Randall Kennedy, Race Relations Law and the Traditionof
Celebration:The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 CoLum. L. REV. 1622, 1642 (1986) (reviewing racial aspects of punishment); Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow
Era: Exploitative or Competitive?, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (1984) (suggesting chain
gang was worse than slavery since slaveholder receives value of slave's output for his entire
working life and therefore he has incentive to maintain his health, whereas on chain gang
there was no such incentive); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction,and Race Discrimination:The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1401, 1413,
1484 (1983) (indicating desperate hardships and cruelties of chain gang). John G. Dipiano,
Note, Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-First Century, 21 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRrm. & Crv. CoNFineMENT 171, 188 (1995) (noting "leasing" of convict labor is
quasi-slave labor)
30 See Feeley et al., supra note 25, at 155 (describing convict lease system as "an inglorious history of American penal policy"). See generally Dipiano, supra note 29, at 188 (noting
"leasing" of convict labor is quasi-slave labor).
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that: "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States ....
Id.; U.S. v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988) (stating Thirteenth Amendment expressly permits labor
imposed as criminal sentence); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 331 (1961) (sentencing prisoner convicted of misdemeanor to highway labor not involuntary servitude under Thirteenth Amendment).
32 See Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding inadequate
funding is not excuse to perpetuate inhuman conditions of confinement); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding prison must operate within constitutional mandates despite inadequate funding from legislature).
33 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 10, 51 (noting requirement of one armed
guard for every 10 to 15 prisoners to ensure efficiency and prevent escape and noting principle purpose of chain gang was to punish by labor exploitation rather than reform). Lack of
adequate training was exacerbated by housing and assigning petty offenders to work with
repeat violent felons. Id. at 81. Southern penal policy maintained that chain gangs existed
'primarily for the protection of society" and that:
[Under] any theory of punishment other than of vengeance or of deterrence, the chain
gang can justify its right to existence only when officials placed in charge of the prisoners are men of character, skilled in methods of controlling men by inspiring respect.
Such men among chain gang officials are very rare. Usually, the men in immediate
charge of county prisoners working the road are by character and training unfair to
have any such authority over other men as is though necessary in the typical prison.
Unfortunate, ignorant men, strained beyond capacity, incapable of fortitude and needing some outlet and escape or a fruitless, barren existence, impose their wills upon
other men more unfortunate and more helpless. Quite often both the supervisor, as the
ranking official in charge of the county prison camp is most frequently called, and the
guards, who are usually not merely guards but also general assistants to the supervisor, are in standards of conduct and ideals of life but little above the average prisoner.
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Amendment. 34 Court-appointed receivers ordered legislators and
prison administrators to consider alternative modes of punishment and to improve prison conditions.3 5 Eventually, chain gangs
were replaced by modern36 prisons subject to administrative and
constitutional guidelines.
A.

Southern Source of Labor Gone Awry

Chain gangs arose predominantly in the post-Civil War, agrarian South, after the abolition of slavery. 3 7 Southern states focused on deterrence and retribution, 38 while Northern states emphasized the rehabilitative goals of incarceration 39 and funded
prison construction.4 0 Many former slaves, now unemployed and
homeless 4 1 were arrested under the pretext of vagrancy, loitering,
Id. at 82-83. Significantly, the public condoned such treatment of chain gang convicts as an
indication of its general attitude toward crime. Id. at 84. Regardless of public approval, the
chain gangs were unconstitutionally managed due to lack of trained supervision. Id. at 36.
34 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 64-80 (describing health and sanitation
problems such as vermin infestation, lack of sewage, inadequate shelter, filth, fetid food,
epidemic disease and death).
35 See Graddick v. Newman, 453 U.S. 928, 931-32 (1981) (having receiver appointed for
failure to comply with court-ordered prison standards); Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp.
628, 636 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (appointing receiver for repeated failure to comply with constitutional standards); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 986-89 (D.R.I. 1977) (prison
closed as "unfit for human habitation"). See generally Ira A. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions
of Private Incarceration,38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 605, 606, 854 (1989) (discussing concept of
involuntary servitude and convict labor).
36 See generally Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 735, 754 (1992) (discussing ultimatum of compliance with
receiver's mandates or raze and rebuild new, satisfactory structure).
37 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 3, 11 (discussing post-Civil War rise of chain
gangs in North Carolina); Martha A. Myers, Inequality and the Punishment of Minor Offenders in the Early 20th Century, 27 LAw & Soc. REV. 313, 313 (1993) (discussing popularity of chain gangs after Reconstruction).
38 See generally Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77,
105-08 (1985) (describing prison system of South as designed to punish and to "produce
penitence - sorrow for past offenses, and an amended life in the future").
39 See People v. Mosley, 78 Misc. 2d 736, 740, 358 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1008 (Monroe County
Ct. 1974) (citing rehabilitation as "major objective of criminal punishment"); STEINER &
BROWN, supra note 25, at 17-18 (suggesting northern climate less suitable for outdoor road
work as well as rise of northern manufacturing and industry as reasons for northern rejection of"degrading spectacle" of chain gangs); see also Elizabeth L. Spaid, Old Totems Tumble in New South, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,June 23, 1995, at 1 (citing differences in penological goals between North and South). See generally STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at
4 (discussing northern preference for imprisonment instead of road work).
40 See State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1910) (discussing disappearance of
physical punishment as result of rise of reformatories with educational and rehabilitative
goals rather than humiliation); STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 62-63 (noting only
eight counties built modern prisons because chain gang population was not large enough to
warrant expense of construction).
41 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 1, 34, 101 (noting that convicts working on
chain gangs were housed in portable workhouses located near poorhouses); Benno C.
Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era.
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disorderly conduct, and public intoxication4 2 to provide cheap labor for plantation owners and municipalities.13 The inability of
most African-American men to pay their fines 4 4 gave rise to the
peonage system, essentially returning them to involuntary
servitude.4 5
Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 646, 648 (1982) (suggesting fines and vagrancy statutes had heightened impact on unemployed, former slaves); Myers, supra note
37, at 320-323 (suggesting chain gang sentencing was racially motivated). Reduced farm
profits were blamed on produce theft attributed to "natural propensities of the Negroes,
intensified by their necessities, but they were also encouraged in it by white thieves who
dealt largely in farm products purchased at night in small quantities with no questions
asked." Id. Most of the state and county prisoners were African-American men, representing a ratio greatly disproportionate to population demographics. Id. at 14-15, 18; see also
Myers, supra, at 321-33 (discussing ratio of black convicts to chain gangs based on type of
crime, length of sentence, and effect of sentence). Race was clearly a factor in physical
brutality meted out in labor camps. Id.
42 See Jamison v. Wimbish, 130 F. 351, 352 (W.D. Ga. 1904), rev'd, 199 U.S. 599 (1905).
Prisoner brought habeas corpus proceeding challenging recorder's authority to impose
chain gang sentence for petty offense absent jury or counsel. Id. The Court referred to chain
gangs as "the most melancholy and distressing spectacle which afflicts the patriot and humanitarian." Id. The district court noted the role of degradation and humiliation implicit in
chain gangs and suggested a return to more humane methods. Id. The court also discussed
the inequity of a system whereby poor, often African-American, laborers who were unable
to pay a $60 dollar fine were sentenced to seven months on a chain gang. Id. at 353, 363; see
also Clarke v. Carlan, 26 S.E.2d 362, 363 (Ga. 1943) (imposing twelve-month sentence on
public works for abandonment of children); Reper v. Mallard, 19 S.E.2d 525, 525 (Ga. 1942)
(concerning misdemeanors punishable "by fine not to exceed $1,000, imprisonment not to
exceed six months to work in the chain gang.., not to exceed 12 months ...in the discretion of the judge"); Pearson v. Wimbish, 52 S.E. 751, 752 (Ga. 1906) (sentencing defendant
to chain gang after arrest without warrant for petty offense and trial without counsel);
STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 35 (citing inability to pay fine for trivial offense often
resulted in housing of petty offenders with violent felons); Schmidt, supra note 29, at 1411
(outlining offenses charged resulting in involuntary servitude).
43 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 103-105 (discussing economic goals of convict
labor and its road construction uses). See generally Jonathan M. Cowen, One Nation's "Gulag"Is Another Nation's "FactoryWithin a Fence": Prison-Laborin the People's Republic of
China and the United States of America, 12 PAC. BASIN L.J. 190, 211 (1993) (discussing use
of prison labor to build and maintain roads common in South although abandoned nationwide); Paul Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C. L. REV. 77, 106 (1985)
(noting post-Civil War farm and prison labor need paralleled Southern economy); Myers,
supra note 37, at 316 (noting demand for public roads and farm work led to longer chain
gang sentences).
44 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 42-43 (noting judges may sentence those
unable to pay fines to road labor).
45 See Cyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 209 (1905) (defining peonage as "status or
condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master...
[for] compulsory service to secure the payment of a debt."); see also STEINER & BROWN,
supra note 25, at 25 n.18 (suggesting peonage systems were intended to benefit AfricanAmerican men who had no relatives or friends to help them avoid prison by paying fines).
See generally Schmidt, supra note 29 (discussing peonage system, its racial implications,
and abolition). Peonage was another method of ensuring a continual supply of labor. Id. at
1411. Recently-freed slaves, without homes or work, were arrested for minor offenses such
as vagrancy and public intoxication. Id. They were subsequently unable to pay the fine
imposed. Id. Someone would then come forward and offer to pay the fine in exchange for a
promise of work from the convict. Id. Failure to appear for work for even one day resulted
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Convicts built and maintained public roads or were "leased" to
other counties and private industries for profit. 46 The law enforcement community and courts soon began to see convicts as a valuable source of labor, which resulted in longer and stricter
sentences.4 7 Portable workhouses were erected at work sites to
avoid transportation costs. 48 Inexperienced and untrained supervision 4 9 led to unsanitary and inhumane housing conditions in
workhouses and prisons. 50 Guards and trustees maintained discipline with force, humiliation and physical brutality. 51 Convicts
endured these deplorable conditions while wearing painful
shackles soldered onto their ankles 52 to prevent escape. 53 In the
evening, the men were chained to their beds as well as to one anin arrest for violating this private employment contract. Id. This resulted in imprisonment
after which the contract had to be fulfilled or additional fines and the circle began anew. Id.
See Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 29 (1942) (declaring peonage unconstitutional). Peonage fell under the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription of involuntary servitude. Id. Former slaves often became trapped in the cycle of involuntary servitude or imprisonment. Id.
Workers failing to appear for work or complete work on time were arrested for failure to
complete their contract and incurred second penalty upon completion of first contract or
fine payment. Id.; see also Exparte Drayton, 153 F. Supp. 986, 986-89 (D.S.C. 1907) (declaring contract termination cannot be criminal offense).
4 See generally J. C. POWELL, THE AmmRcAN SIBERIA (Patterson Smith 1970) (1891) (recounting experiences of Florida chain gang supervisor).
47 See Parish, supra note 5 (noting Civil War destruction of property and prisons resulted in leasing convicts as plantation labor and that until late 1880s chain gangs were
main form of convict labor in eight Southern states).
48 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 55-58 (describing work houses).
49 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing consequences of untrained chain gang guards).
50 See STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 74-75. Convicts afflicted with contagious tuberculosis or venereal disease were not quarantined. Id. The workhouses were not designed
for long-term housing of many men so that the facilities suffered inadequate ventilation,
substandard sanitation, climatic extremes, fetid food, infestation and disease. Id. at 75-79.
51 See id. at 105. Chain gangs were comprised of up to 100 men. Id. Since economy was
the primary goal, discipline was enforced by restraints, threats and physical abuse. Id.
52 See Parish, supra note 5 (noting that, in past, chain gang convicts were tethered to 14
lb. ball).
53 See Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783, 785-87 (D.N.J. 1949) (holding that extracting
confession by beating African-American teenager was sufficient constitutional violation to
warrant denial of extradition). In Harper,the petitioner was released on a writ of habeas
corpus. Id. at 787. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, as the
asylum state, found petitioner's treatment in Alabama violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. At 15, without benefit of counsel, petitioner was beaten until he confessed
to stealing five dollars. Id. at 784. Once incarcerated, he was flogged for not eating the
worm-infested food. Id. at 785. The district court found that compared to other conditions,
his leg irons were only a minor cruelty. Id. at 786. In light of the circumstances, the same
court held that the beatings prior to the confession, the lack of representation by counsel,
the county camp labor system, along with the conditions to which he was subjected,
"spell[ed] out cruel and unusual punishment.... ." Id. at 787; see also In re Middlebrooks,
88 F. Supp. 943, 952 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (refusing to grant request of state demanding extradition of convict subjected to cruel and unusual punishment); STEINER & BROWN, supra note
25, at 89-99 (describing disciplinary measures such as restraints and flogging).
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other.5 4 Under these conditions, the average life span of a convict
was five years,5 5 making assignment to a chain gang tantamount
to a death sentence. 5 6 These inhumane conditions flourished because of the complexities of extradition principles, 5 7 a "hands-off"
approach by the federal courts in deference to the states with regard to penological issues,5" and inadequate legal remedies for the
convicts. 5 9
B. Abandonment of Chain Gangs
The barbaric and inhumane conditions endured by chain gang
convicts caused prisoners to seek refuge in other states.6 ° States
then initiated extradition proceedings to regain custody of these
54 See In re Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 947 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (describing shackling of
chain gang prisoners in sleeping quarters); STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 95
(describing methods of shackling chain gang prisoners).
55 See id. at 40 (stating average life of convict after sentencing to chain gang road crew
was less than five years).
56 See Jamison v. Wimbish, 130 F. 351, 361 (W.D. Ga. 1904) (describing chain gang prisoner as 'toiling on the public roads in the frantic energy of one who works under fear of
death, or of punishment to which in the mind of a vast majority of men, death itself would
be preferable"); Roback, supra note 29, at 1170 (noting 45% mortality rate on chain gangs);
Schmidt, supra note 29, at 653 (confirming drastically shortened life expectancy of chain
gang convicts).
57 See infra notes 60, 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in seeking
remedy for constitutional violation through extradition proceedings).
58 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting courts are "illequipped" to manage prisons); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981) (limiting court intervention to correction of unconstitutional prison conditions); see also
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 403 (1974) (finding that where prison conditions violate Constitution, federal court has duty to intervene); Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039,
1044 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting federal court may impose conditions on state to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions). But see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 ("Courts cannot assume that state legislators and prison officials are insensitive to constitutional requirements."); Spain v Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining that
prisoners do not relinquish Eighth Amendment protections at "prison gate").
59 See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 91-93 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating
that to require petitioner to exhaust state remedies would require him "to suffer torture
and mutilation or risk death itself to get relief in Alabama" and. "run a gamut of blood and
terror to get to his legal rights").
60 See, e.g., In re Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (extradition
proceeding to return chain gang prisoner fleeing from sickness, beatings, and gruelling);
Harper v. Wall, 85 F. Supp. 783, 784 (D.N.J. 1949) (New Jersey extradition proceeding to
return prisoner freeing from Alabama chain gang and life-threatening conditions); Ex parte
Marshall, 85 F. Supp. 771, 772 (D.N.J. 1949) (New Jersey proceeding to return chain gang
escapee to Georgia); State ex rel. Toht v. McClure, 96 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (Ohio
habeas corpus proceeding to review extradition of chain gang prisoner to Florida where he
suffered lack of sanitation, contaminated food, physical punishment and exhaustion); Stewart v. State, 475 P.2d 600, 600-01 (Or. Ct. App. 1970) (Oregon habeas corpus proceeding to
review extradition of Mississippi chain gang prisoner); Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v.
Baldi, 106 A.2d 777, 777-78 (Pa. 1954) (Pennsylvania habeas corpus proceeding to review
extradition of Georgia chain gang escapee fleeing torture and unsanitary conditions).
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fleeing prisoners. 6 1 The only mechanism available for escapees to
resist extradition was to file a writ of habeas corpus in the asylum
state.6 2 These escapees maintained that return to the "home
state" would be met with retribution and further brutality.6 3 The
typical habeascorpus petition asserted that the "totality" of prison
conditions violated established standards of decency, humanity,
as well as the Constitution.6 4 Since extradition laws did not permit an asylum state to review claims challenging the constitutionality of conditions in a demanding state, 65 federal courts pre61 See, e.g., Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. at 945 (California warrant issued pursuant to
Georgia extradition demand); Harper,85 F. Supp. at 784 (New Jersey warrant issued in
response to Alabama extradition demand); Marshall, 85 F. Supp. at 772 (New Jersey warrant issued following Georgia extradition demand); Stewart, 475 P.2d at 600-01 (Mississippi sought extradition writ from Oregon).
62 See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1952) (requiring exhaustion of state remedies before bringing federal habeas corpus proceeding); Res v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308,
311 (9th Cir. 1951) (noting that state provides adequate remedy but requires return of
petitioner to demanding state requiring 'substantial inconvenience"); Davis v. O'Connell,
185 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1951) (stating chain gang fugitive must exhaust state remedies
before seeking federal court protection).
63 See Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 87, 89-90. In Sweeney, a fugitive from an Alabama prison
was arrested in Ohio and held for extradition. Id. at 87. The fugitive sought a writ of
habeas corpus and asked the federal court in the asylum state to pass upon the constitutionality of his treatment in Alabama. Id. at 88-89. The Supreme Court held that
'[clonsiderations fundamental to our federal system require that the prisoner test the
claimed unconstitutionality of his treatment by Alabama in the courts of that State." Id. at
90; Davis, 185 F.2d at 517 (holding before party may invoke jurisdiction of federal court in
habeas corpus proceeding to test legality of sentence in demanding state he "must have
exhausted his state remedies in that state"); State ex rel. Toht v. McClure, 96 N.E.2d 308,
309-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (holding state had no power upon habeas corpus proceedings to
consider whether constitutional rights of petitioner were likely to be violated by sibling
state for which he was held on writ of extradition). The McClure court maintained that a
writ of habeas corpus was an "extraordinary remedy" granted only upon a clear showing,
not "on a mere expectancy of a violation of a constitutional right." Id. at 310. Since the
court presumed that Florida prison authorities would not violate petitioners constitutional
rights, they held such a writ was unwarranted. Id. at 311. Furthermore, if there were any
constitutional rights violated, the proper forum for such an action was in the demanding
state. Id.; see also Marshall,85 F. Supp. at 772-73. At a habeas corpus proceeding in New
Jersey, a sheriff testified that alleged inhuman punishment had ceased and that the guards
responsible had been prosecuted and convicted. Id. at 774. Based on this, the court concluded that the prisoner would not be released on writ of habeas corpus in Georgia. Id. at
775; accord Baldi, 106 A.2d at 780 (holding that violation of constitutional rights in demanding state could not be allowed to interfere with extradition proceeding). Contra
Harper85 F. Supp. at 787 (granting habeas corpus and releasing prisoner based on unconstitutional conditions of state labor system).
64 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 362-63 (1981) (holding Eighth Amendment
challenges require examination of "totality of circumstances"); see also Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (stating Eighth Amendment embodied "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency" (quoting Jackson v. Bishop,
404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)); Harper, 85 F. Supp. at 787 (examining conditions of
demanding state in concluding that treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment).
65 See Res, 188 F.2d at 310-11. Despite such findings, however, prisoners seeking to
avoid extradition were often unsuccessful because of the hands-off approach courts believed
was required. Id. However, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
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sumed that the demanding state acted in accordance with the
United States Constitution.6 6 Therefore, the only forum in which
an escapee could challenge the constitutionality of his sentence
was in the demanding state. 67 However, the availability of this
remedy was further limited because the Eighth Amendment was
not applied uniformly to the states until 1962.68
Eventually, the rising number of claims attracted the attention
of the federal courts. 6 9 In response to the continuing inhumane
California, in Middlebrooks, granted a writ of habeas corpus because the Georgia sentence
violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. In re Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943, 951 (S.D. Cal. 1950). Petitioner was an uneducated, young African-American male who was repeatedly arrested for burglary, the last time for which he
was convicted and sentenced without benefit of counsel or a trial. Id. at 945-46. He recounted uncivilized and unsanitary confinement conditions, claimed that the prisoners
worked from sunrise to sunset with only a short break, and that the food caused nausea
and dysentery. Id. at 946. The prisoners were also chained and often beaten and whipped.
Id. Petitioner's release on writ of habeas corpus was later reversed for failure to exhaust
state remedies. 188 F.2d at 310-11; see also Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 88, 90 (1952) (holding
prisoner's claim of unconstitutional treatment must be brought in court of demanding
state); Davis, 185 F.2d at 517 (requiring remedies in demanding state be exhausted before
invoking federal court jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceeding); Adams v. Indiana, 271
N.E.2d 425, 430 (Ind. 1971) (finding judge's personal approval or disapproval of punishment mandated by legislature irrelevant); Commonwealth v. Baldi, 106 A.2d 777, 791 (Pa.
1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (suggesting poor, uneducated Black prisoners did not
have access to courts or remedies); Peter Morrison, The New Chain Gang, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
21, 1995, at Al, A22 (confirming recent trend in courts deferring to state officials and
prison administrators and movement towards more "punitive prisons").
66 See McClure, 96 N.E.2d at 311 (finding asylum state court denied petitioner's writ of
habeas corpus because of presumption that demanding state's prison authorities act in conformity with Constitution).
67 See Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 90 (1952) (holding escapee's claim of unconstitutional treatment was matter for demanding state); Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513, 517
(8th Cir. 1950) (denying habeas corpus petition for failure to first exhaust remedies available in demanding state). See generally supra notes 58 and 60 (discussing "hands-off" posture of federal courts in extradition proceedings). But see Baldi, 106 A.2d at 786 (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (commenting on petitioner's unlikely opportunity to secure counsel
or successfully challenge claim in demanding state).
68 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding state statute imposing prison sentence for drug addiction was cruel and unusual punishment). The Robinson
Court also found the Eighth Amendment to be applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 675; see also Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating "lilt was not until 1962 that the Supreme Court
applied the Eighth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. at 951 (stating Eighth Amendment protections did not apply to
states).
69 See Sweeney, 344 U.S. at 90 (1952) (explaining that constitutionality of prison conditions is to be tested in state court); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126, 1133-36 (5th Cir.
1982) (discussing federal court intervention and prison receiverships); Wright v. Rushen,
642 F.2d 1129, 1132 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing traditional "hands-off' approach of federal judicial to prison administration); Res v. Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308, 310-11 (9th Cir.
1951); Davis v. O'Connell, 185 F.2d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 1951) (requiring exhaustion of state
remedies to challenge extradition); State ex rel Toht v. McClure, 96 N.E.2d 208, 309-10
(Ohio Ct. App. 1950) (noting that state courts are appropriate fora for redressing constitutional violations of prisons where Eighth Amendment not limit of state action). But see Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979). The Bell Court recognized that intervention by federal
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and unconstitutional conditions of confinement in state prisons,
federal courts ordered reforms in administration, supervision, and
sanitation."0 Many prisons defied such decrees, however, under
the pretense of insufficient funding by state legislatures.7 " The
federal courts ultimately responded by placing uncooperative prisons into receivership or by shutting them down, forcing reexami72
nation and reform of penal institutions and punishments.
Although never expressly abolished, chain gangs ultimately were
abandoned as a result of insurmountable administrative, economic, and constitutional hurdles.
II.

REVIVAL

OF CHAIN GANGS

Present-day judiciary and state legislatures have imposed
stricter punishments in an increased effort to deter crime and
prison violence, as well as to reduce expenses incident to fighting
crime.7 3 In particular, three states have resorted to chain gangs 4
courts to stop "these sordid aspects of our prison systems" was necessary, but felt that
sometimes courts became too "enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations." Id. The
Supreme Court noted that federal court review was limited to issues of "whether a particular system violates any prohibition of the Constitution or in the case of a federal prison, a
statute," and that they were not permitted to invoke their own solutions to these problems.
Id.
70 See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 328 (M.D. Ala. 1976), (recognizing federal
court's ability to intervene into state prison's affairs when they are plagued with "massive
constitutional infirmities"); aff'd sub noma.Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977) Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 280 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 559 F.2d 283 (5th
Cir. 1977) (noting federal court's reluctance to interfere in process of state prisons, unless
prisoner's constitutional rights are in jeopardy).
71 See Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1044 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting "lilt is well-established that inadequate funding will not excuse the perpetuating of unconstitutional conditions of confinement"); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211-13 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing need to provide constitutional prison conditions may necessitate state
expenditures).
72 See Newman, 466 F. Supp. at 630, 635, 638 (placing Alabama prison system into receivership after finding Board of Corrections had failed to make genuine effort to remedy
unconstitutional prison conditions); Crain v. Bordenkircher, 454 S.E.2d 101, 111 (W. Va.
1994) (demonstrating receivership appropriate remedy for prison failure to comply with
court orders to eliminate Eighth Amendment violations); see also Shaw v. Allen, 771 F.
Supp. 760, 761-62, 764 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (holding failure to bring jail's conditions up to
constitutional standards warranted appointment of receiver).
73 See Hearingof the Senate Judiciary Comm. on Nomination of Janet Reno as Attorney
General, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (dated March 9, 1993 discussing causes and costs of
crime and role of federal government in thwarting crime epidemic); Lynne N. Henderson,
The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 945 (1985) (suggesting criminal justice system is misleading focus of crime-related problems); Michele H. Kalstein et al., The
State of Civil Liberties: Where Do We Go From Here?, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 575, 576,
580 (1992) (discussing effectiveness of punishment in deterring crime); David H. Norris and
Thomas Peters, Fiscal Responsibility and Criminal Sentencing in Illinois: The Time for
Change is Now, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 317, 317-18 (1993) (noting role of economic considerations in resolving crime and prison issues); Mark W. Owens, California's Three Strikes
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to accomplish all three goals,7 5 in hopes that a harsher prison experience will be a disincentive to future crime. 76 Additionally,
mandatory labor is expected to provide enough physical activity to
alleviate boredom and create "healthy exhaustion" so that inmates
will be too tired to fight each other or prison guards.7v These
states have structured their chain gangs to conform to the guidelines outlined in past case law. 78 Nevertheless, inmates have alLaw: Desperate Times Require Desperate Measures-But Will it Work?, 26 PAC. L.J. 881,
887 (1995) (citing trend of stricter repeat-offender legislation); 48 Hours, supra note 9 (reporting high cost of imprisonment).
74 E.g. ALA. CODE § 14-3-53 (1995) (shackles and chains worn by prisoners on consent of
corrections board); id. § 14-4-2 (county determines site where hard labor performed by
prison inmates); id. § 14-5-5 (county may assign convict to work in and around public building or on county projects); id. § 23-1-37 (permitting highway work, construction and maintenance); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-252 (1994) ("cooperative prison labor system" permitting chain gang highway crews); 1995 FLA. SESS. LAw SERV. § 283 (West) (requiring
implementation of plan by December 1, 1995, requiring inmates to wear leg irons and work
in chain gang teams); see also Morrison, supra note 65 (discussing rise of chain gangs); 48
Hours, supra note 9 (noting return and spread of chain gangs due to rising crime and expense of imprisonment); Today (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 28, 1995) (interviewing
Alabama Prison Commissioner Ron Jones and American Civil Liberties Union, National
Prison Project Director Alvin Bronstein discussing expense of imprisonment and constitutionality of chain gangs); Telephone Interview with William Grey, Counsel to Alabama
Governor Fob James (Aug. 16, 1995) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with William Grey]
(stating that "cost is the ultimate factor.").
75 See 48 Hours, supra note 9 (quoting Alabama Governor Fob James as stating chain
gang employed for "deterrent impact"); CBS This Morning, (CBS television broadcast, Apr.
28, 1995) [hereinafter CBS This Morning (Apr. 28)](reporting Mississippi State Representative Tom Cameron suggesting chain gang experience expected to deter crime); Navarro,
supra note 11 (quoting Florida Corrections Department spokesman explaining goal of chain
gang is deterrence); Scott Wade, Forced Labor Gets Second, Closer Look; Are Chain Gangs
a Crime Deterrent?, LouisvIuLE COURIER-JOURNAL, July 30, 1995, at Al (reporting benefit
of exhaustion after 12-hour day on chain gang); Telephone Interview with William Grey,
supra note 74 (stating long day at hard labor expected to sufficiently tire convicts to reduce
prison violence); see also CBS This Morning, (CBS television broadcast, May 26, 1995)
[hereinafter CBS This Morning (May 26)] (reporting Arizona Sheriff notes chain gang goal
to "[save] taxpayers' money").
76 See 48 Hours, supra note 9 (quoting Alabama Governor Fob James as stating chain
gang employed for "deterrent impact"); CBS This Morning (April 28), supra note 75 (reporting Mississippi State Representative Tom Cameron suggesting chain gang experience expected to deter crime); Navarro, supra note 11, at A12 (quoting Florida Corrections Department spokesman explaining goal of chain gang is deterrence). See generally Weiser, supra
note 5 (discussing how stricter sentencing policies reduce crime rate).
77 Wade, supra note 75, at Al (reporting benefit of exhaustion after 12-hour day on chain
gang); Telephone Interview with William Grey, supra note 74 (stating long day at hard
labor expected to sufficiently tire convicts and reduce prison violence).
78 See ALA. CODE § 14-4-7 (1975) (prohibiting women from working "as a laborer on any
public highway in this state"); 1995 Iowa Legs. Serv. HF 215 (West) (stating hard labor
.shall be available to both male and female inmates").
See Morrison, supra note 65, at Al. In the modern Alabama chain gang, an epileptic
prisoner was accused of "shirking" and was chained to the hitching post for 10 hours as
punishment. Id. Subsequently, a nurse confirmed that he had suffered an epileptic seizure.
Id. This is a disturbing continuation of similar practices that occurred during the 1920s. Id.
See also STEINER & BROWN, supra note 25, at 76 (referring to epileptic as "malingerer"). The
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leged that several aspects of the modern chain gangs are
unconstitutional.7 9
A.

Politicaland Societal Predicates

Americans have become increasingly concerned about the cost
and effect of rising crime rates.8 0 The public supports reduced tax
dollars spent on prisoner care, comfort, and confinement."' The
expansion of prisoners' rights over the past thirty years has been
blamed for current increases in crime 2 as it is widely viewed as
pampering the criminal, thereby reducing the punitive effect of incarceration. s 3 Consequently, Americans support less costly measpractice of chaining a convict to a hitching post as described has been held to be a violation
of the Eighth Amendment.
See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974) (handcuffing inmates to fence for
long periods of time either standing or maintaining awkward positions is corporal punishment violating contemporary standards of decency, human dignity, and Eighth
Amendment).
79 See Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (M.D. Ala. filed Sept. 19, 1995) (Second Amended
Complaint at 1, 10) (alleging Eighth Amendment violations including chain gang concept,
unsanitary toilet facilities, hitching post punishments).
80 See CBS This Morning (April 28), supra note 75 (stating return of chain gang is
America's response to high crime rate by "mak[ing] hard time even harder"); see also
Weiser, supra note 5 (showing "get-tough attitude" toward criminals caused five percent
drop in crime rate). See generally Hearingsbefore the Senate JudiciaryComm. on National
Drug Control Policy, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation) (indicating heightened public fear over increasing crime
rate); Braun & Pasternak, supra note 4, at Al (suggesting that perception of increased
crime is result of local crime and media focus on violence); Cullen, supra note 6, at 16
(noting Pennsylvania Governor Weld said his campaign to restore death penalty was "response to 'moral consensus' that death is an appropriate punishment for same crimes");
Gallagher, supra note 6 (noting New York Governor fulfilled campaign promise by signing
death penalty bill into law); Hallinan, supra note 7, at 7 (noting lawmakers seek to return
to "no frills" prisons); Jerusalem, supra note 8, at 221 (indicating angry parents insisted on
legislative change to prevent sexual offenders from repeating offenses); Mendez, supra note
8, at 1 (reporting public support of legislation to prevent sexual offender recidivism);
Owens, supra note 4, at 802 (noting increased fear of crime resulted in emphasis on safety
and new legislation); Peterson, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing anti-crime mood has led to
'crackdown on the amenities and free services inmates receive"); Thornburgh, supra note 4,
at 14-15 (suggesting politicians should act on "tough talk about crime" in political rhetoric);
48 Hours, supra note 9 (stating cost of corrections is nationwide problem); supra note 5 and
sources cited therein (discussing public support for "tough-on-crime" political platforms).
81 See H.R. REP. No. 663, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing Representative Zimmer's amendment to Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent
luxurious prison conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitting
Representative Pryce's plan to prevent federal prisoners from strengthening their ability to
fight); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601 (West 1994) (noting prison administration authority not limited to restrict privileges); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-196.3 (1995) (outlining "Credits
Against the Service of Sentences and for Attainment of Prison Privileges" in Article 19A).
82 See Weiser, supra note 5 (noting American Legislative Exchange Council report asserting "more lenient approach" led to "tripling of the crime rate").
83 Id.
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ures which also increase deterrence 84 by making the prison experience more severe8 5 by limiting prisoners' rights and reducing
amenities.8 6 Thus, criminal justice goals have shifted toward emphasizing deterrence and punishment87 because rehabilitation
has been perceived as an unrealistic goal of the American penal
system. 8
Recent trends in state and federal legislatures,89 as well as in
the judiciary,9" seem to mirror the country's growing concern with
84 See Bates, supra note 11 (suggesting chain gang combines "retribution with economy"); Marc Mauer, Politics, Crime Control... And Baseball?, 9 CRIM. JUST. 30, 33 (1994)
(discussing economic and deterrent impact of "three-strikes" legislation); Dennis Wagner,
Cons Line Up for Chain Gang Fresh Air Better Than Packed Cell, PHOENIX GAZETte, May
27, 1995, at A1 (noting economic benefit of chain gang).
85 See supra note 5 (discussing public approval of stricter sentencing methods enacted to
reduce crime); H.R. REP. No. 663, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing Representative
Zimmer's amendment to Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent luxurious prison conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, supra note 7 (submitting Representative Pryce's plan to prevent federal prisoners from strengthening their ability to fight); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 2601 (West 1994) (noting prison administration authority not limited to restrict privileges); id. (West 1994) (noting prison Administration authority not limited to
restriction of privileges); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (1994) (outlining mandatory sentencing
guidelines upon fourth felony offense); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 278, § 33E (West 1995)
(reinstating death penalty in Massachusetts); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-196.3 (1995) (outlining
"Credits Against the Service of Sentences and for Attainment of Prison Privileges" in Article 19A); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:706 (West 1995) ("Notification of community of intent of sex
offender released from correctional facility or adjudicated delinquent to reside in municipality.") ("Megan's Law") (enacted Oct. 31, 1994, providing public notification provisions for
repeated sex offenders); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (Michie 1994) (outlining mandatory
life imprisonment for three violent felony convictions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (Law Coop. 1995) (outlining life sentence for prisoner convicted three times for delineated crimes);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (1995) ("Three strikes" statute); 1990 Wash. Laws Ch. 3
§§ 1401-06 (permitting police to notify communities about sex offenders living nearby when
necessary for public protection).
86 See generally Jeff Potts, American Penal Institutions and Two Alternative Proposals
for Punishment, 34 S. TEx. L. REV. 443, 455-60 (1993) (discussing penal system's failure to
prevent recidivism).

87 See, e.g., Robert P. Gritton, Capital Punishment:New Weapons in the Sentencing Process, 24 GA. L. REV. 423, 441 (1990) (stating goal of death penalty is retribution); see also
Jonathan Freedland, Law and Order: Cruel and Unusual: Sheriff Joe Strikes Home, Ow.
TAWA CITIZEN, June 10, 1995, at B3 (quoting Arizona sheriff, "I use my jails as a crime
deterrent.. . .") This sheriff has an 80% approval rating "in a county with a population of
2.5 million-larger than that of 18 U.S. states." Id. The "primary goal of Alabama's chain
gang" was to soothe voter anxiety about rising crime rates; it has succeeded. Id.
88 E.g., Raymond Y. Lin, A Prisoner'sConstitutional Right to Attorney Assistance, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1279, 1315 n.229 (1993) (citing Serril, Is Rehabilitation Dead?, CORRECTIONS MAG., May/June 1995, at 3-12, 21-32 (discussing loss of hope for rehabilitation)).
89 See Steve Berg, Peeling the Orange, STAR Thin. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 1, 1995,
at A20 (commenting on "new conservative Congress" shifting economic burdens to local
levels); Harwood, supra note 21 (discussing California Governor Pete Wilson's campaign as
mirroring national political climate).
90 See Marcia Coyle, An Emboldened Majority Breaks Ground, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995,
at C2 (discussing conservative trend of Supreme Court decisions); Christopher E. Smith &
Thomas R. Hensley, Survey: The Supreme Court Politicaland Appointment Process, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court Packing Efforts of PresidentsReagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1111, 1112-13 (1994) (demonstrating from 1981 to 1992, retirement of five Justices
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"law and order."9 ' Longer, tougher sentences9 2 and the elimination of nonessential privileges for inmates,9 3 perceived as heightening the punitive impact of imprisonment, 94 are the conseprovided two consecutive "conservative" Presidents with similar ideologies opportunity to

reverse "liberal" trend of Warren and Burger Courts). See generally Sandin v. Conner, 63
U.S.L.W. 4601, 4604-05, 4609-10 (U.S. June 19, 1995) (declining to expand circumstances
under which prisoner's liberty interests are implicated); David G. Savage, Vanishing Voice

of Liberalism: The Supreme Court's Conservative Pace is Expected to Quicken with
Thurgood Marshall's Retirement. Winners are Likely to be Prosecutors and Police, L.A.
TiMEs, June 29, 1991, at 1 (suggesting Justice Marshall's retirement would quicken Court's
"conservative shift").
91 Paul Katzeff, CriminalDefense Lawyers Boost Bar Groups, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 27, 1992,
at 7 (asserting rehabilitation was failure of "permissive liberalism"); David Rose, UK: Back
to Jackboot Justice, GuARDiAN (London), Mar. 12, 1995, at 27 (noting focus on retribution
through "physical hardship and pain" rather than rehabilitation); 48 Hours, supra note 9
(quoting Alabama Governor Fob James, "[y]ou're going to serve your time and then you
don't want to come back"); see also Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. 1980)
(stating it was not court's responsibility to "supervise those elected officials whose responsibility it is to administer the day to day operation of [jails]").
92 See H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 7 (proposing Representative Zimmer's amendment
to Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent luxurious prison
conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, supra note 7 (submitting Representative Pryce's plan to
prevent federal prisoners from strengthening their ability to fight); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 2601 (West 1994) (noting prison administration authority not limited to restrict privileges); id. (West 1994) (noting prison Administration authority not limited to restriction of
privileges); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (1994) (outlining mandatory sentencing guidelines
upon fourth felony offense); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 278, § 33E (West 1995) (reinstating
death penalty in Massachusetts); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-196.3 (1995) (outlining "Credits
Against the Service of Sentences and for Attainment of Prison Privileges" in Article 19A);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:706 (West 1995) ("Notification of community of intent of sex offender
released from correctional facility or adjudicated delinquent to reside in municipality.")
("Megan's Law") (enacted Oct. 31, 1994, providing public notification provisions for repeated sex offenders); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (Michie 1994) (outlining mandatory life
imprisonment for three violent felony convictions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (Law Co-op.
1995) (outlining life sentence for prisoner convicted three times for delineated crimes);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (1995) ("Three strikes" statute); 1990 Wash. Laws Ch. 3
§§ 1401-06 (permitting police to notify communities about sex offenders living nearby when
necessary for public protection).
9s See Mark Curriden, Hard Time, 81 A.B.A. J. 72, 73 (1995); Dennis, supra note 29, at 1
(noting prison should not be "country club" experience). Budget cuts and strong anti-crime
public sentiment in the 1990s have some states reducing living standards for prison inmates. Id. Believing that the courts have elevated prisoners' living conditions to a level
above that enjoyed prior to incarceration, Congress and state governments have begun to
take action. Id. Proposed changes to increase the punitive aspects of imprisonment include
limiting prisoner standing to sue, removing luxuries and privileges such as weight rooms
and television, and making prisoners pay for their room and board. Id. Predictably, civil
rights advocates oppose such sweeping changes and warn that worsened prison conditions
will prevent rehabilitation. Id.; Morrison, supra note 65, at A23 (citing American Civil Liberties Union opposition to chain gangs and removal of prison privileges).
94 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (declaring harshness of prison life is
"part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay"); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial
Dilemma: Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 912 n.62
(1990) (noting belief of some that prison conditions should be harsh); Worth, supra note 10
(quoting Massachusetts Governor Weld approving harsh prison conditions which should be
"a tour through the circles of hell"). But see Morrison, supra note 65, at Al (noting academics' theory that austere conditions create hardened criminals).
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quences of this changing attitude. 9 5 The taxpaying public holds
the view that inmates at most prisons receive excessive benefits
and privileges.9 6 Both state and federal legislators have proposed
a return to the bare minimum conditions required under the Constitution.9 7 For example, the "No Frills Act"98 recently proposed in
Congress9 9 would restrict access to federal funds for prison construction to those states which eliminate prison "luxuries" such as
computers, R-rated films and weightlifting equipment. 10 0 These
restrictions risk a return to the same circumstances which originally gave rise these prisoner privileges. 10 In the past, prison
overcrowding, coupled with a lack of recreation or work, often re-

95

See supra note 92.
96 See Morrison, supra note 65, at A22 (reporting tougher prisons are perceived more
effective than those with prisoner amenities).
97 See id. The American Civil Liberties Union points out that "[slome of the things people
consider frills are constitutionally mandated." Id. Adequate recreation time, access to lawyers, a fully stocked and accessible law library, adequate diet, hygiene and medical care are
constitutionally required. Id. See also Cutting Down on Amenities, supra note 7, at B7.
However, eliminating weight rooms, television, coffee, and cigarettes cannot be included in
the list of requirements. Id. Indeed, New Jersey Republican Representative Dick Zimmer,
sponsored two "no-frills" proposals.
See H.R. REP No. 663, supra note 7. Congressman Zimmer recognizes the inequity of
taxpayers working hard to subsidize criminals "eat[ing] steak and watch[ing] television."
Cutting Down on Amenities, supra note 7, at B7. He proposes that prison food should be "no
better food than the U.S. Army." Id. CBS This Morning (April 28), supra note 75. Tennessee Democratic Congressman Don Bird (D-Tenn.) has also sponsored stricter prison legislation. Id. Nevertheless, some experts maintain that making imprisonment so onerous as to
be a deterrent itself may be an incorrect premise. Id. "They think they'll never be caught.
These people advocating the return of the chain gangs are saying they want to treat prisoners like wild animals," suggests National Prison Project Director Alvin Bronstein. Id. "Unfortunately, it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy." Id.
98 See H.R. REP. No. 663, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing Representative Zimmer's amendment to Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent
luxurious prison conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitting
Representative Pryce's plan to prevent federal prisoners from increasing physical strength
and their ability to fight).
99 See H.R. REP. No. 663, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing Representative Zimmer's amendment to Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent
luxurious prison conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (submitting
Representative Pryce's plan to prevent federal prisoners from strengthening their ability to
fight).
100 See Peterson, supra note 7. There is much controversy over the appropriate goals of
imprisonment, and whether those goals will be served by stripping inmates of privileges.
Id.
101 See Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 634-35 (M.D. Ala. 1979) (suggesting boredom and frustration cause prisoner violence); see also Morrison, supra note 65, at A23 (reporting idleness creates potential for violence). But see Curriden, supra note 93, at 72-74
(discussing tougher prisons). Tennessee Representative Don Bird believes that after an
eight-hour day swinging "[a] heavy sledge hammer" prisoners will not need exercise equipment to alleviate prison tensions. Id.
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sulted 2in inmate boredom and inertia that led to uprisings and
10

riots.

Politicians and the electorate, in a search for more effective
methods of reducing crime, 10 3 recidivism, 10 4 and prison overcrowding, 0 5 began to fashion new punishments 10 6 and curtail

privileges. 10 7 Reexamination of the use of capital punishment and
102 See Morrison, supra note 65, at A23 (discussing conditions culminating in Attica
prison riots).
103 See Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Comm. on National Drug Control Policy,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, proposing potential solutions to rising crime rate); H.R. REP. No. 663, supra
note 7 (proposing Representative Zimmer's amendment to Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent luxurious prison conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, supra
note 7 (1995) (submitting Representative Pryce's plan to prevent federal prisoners from
strengthening their ability to fight); CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601 (West 1994) (noting prison
administration authority not limited to restriction of privileges); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15196.3 (1995) (outlining "Credits Against the Service of Sentences for Attainment of Prison
Privileges" in Article 19A); Owens, supra note 4, at 881-82 (indicating public fear resulting
from increased media coverage of violence); Wave of Fear,supra note 4, at Al (noting individual fear of Americans); Perilon its Mind, supra note 7, at Al (suggesting that perception
of increased crime is result of local crime and media focus on violence); Hallinan, supra
note 7, at 7 (noting lawmakers are seeking return to "no frills" prisons); Cutting Down on
Amenities, supra note 7, at B7 (noting three New Jersey country jails have begun to charge
inmates for medications); Researchers Divided, supra note 7, at 12 (discussing anti-crime
mood has led to "crackdown on the amenities and free services" inmates receive); Thornburgh, supra note 4, at 12 (reporting former United States Attorney General's suggestion
that practical application of anti-crime campaign rhetoric parallels predominate social
concern).
104 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (1994) (outlining mandatory sentencing guidelines upon
fourth felony offense); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-:7-6 (West 1995) ("Notification of community of
intent of sex offender released from correctional facility or adjudicated delinquent to reside
in municipality.") ('Megan's Law") (enacted Oct. 31, 1994, providing public notification provisions for repeated sex offenders); N.M. STAT. ANN. §31-18-23 (Michie 1994) (outlining
mandatory life-imprisonment for three violent felony convictions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-2545 (Law. Co-op. 1995) ("three strikes" statute); 1990 Wash. Laws ch 3 §§ 1401-06 (permitting police to notify communities about sex offenders living nearby when necessary for public protection."); Jerusalem, supra note 8, at 221 (indicating angry parents insisted on legislative change to prevent sexual offenders from repeating offenses); Mendez, supra note 8, at
1; 48 Hours, supra note 9 (discussing preference for stricter criminal penalties leading to
reconsideration of chain gangs).
105 See Morrison, supra note 65, at A23 (suggesting prisoner idleness leads to violence);
Adam Nossiter, FightErupts In Prison, Injuring13, N.Y. TImsS, July 5, 1995, at B4 (noting
effect of overcrowding on prison violence); Jacques Steinberg, Doubling Up in Prison Cells
Saves Money but Stirs Inmates Anger, N.Y. Tudvs, July 8, 1995, at 21 (reporting overcrowded prison leads to inmate violence).
106 See Kimberly A. Peters, Chemical Castration:An Alternative to Incarceration, 31
DUQ. L. Rev. 307, 313-15 (1993) (evaluating chemical castration as alternative to incarceration of sex offenders); Shuster, supra note 13, at 1003 (noting use of bumper stickers and
signs indicating criminal conviction as punishment).
107 See H.R. REP. No. 663, supra note 7 (proposing Representative Zimmer's amendment
to Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to prevent luxurious prison
conditions); H.R. REP. No. 515, supra note 7 (submitting Representative Pryce's plan to
prevent federal prisoners from strengthening their ability to fight); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 2601 (West 1994) (noting prison administration authority not limited to restrict privileges); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-196.3 (1995) (outlining "Credits Against the Service of
Sentences and for Attainment of Prison Privileges" in Article 19A).
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chain gangs,1 0 8 once considered unconstitutional, 109 typifies the
current trend of promoting punishment and deterrence 10° as a solution to the perceived failure of the American criminal justice
system. 111

B. Modern Chain Gangs
Three states have enacted legislation reinstituting chain3
gangs,1

2

and several others have proposed similar legislation."1

In modern chain gangs, labor and confinement conditions now
108 See Curriden, supra note 93, at 74 (discussing Tennessee's proposed "No Frills Prisons" legislation). Democratic State Representative Bird also favors revival of chain gangs
in Tennessee. Id. Mississippi prison officials are requiring inmates, especially those on
work crews, to wear black and white striped uniforms emblazoned with the word "convict"
on the back as a form of humiliation. Id. Humiliation as a punishment form is reminiscent
of the early American common law penal system. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and
American CriminalLaw, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1881-82 (1992) (discussing use of public
humiliation as punishment in Colonial America).
See Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring convicted driver to affix bumper sticker reading "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE" was not violative of Eighth Amendment). New and creative penalties that include
an element of humiliation, such as bumper stickers declaring an individual to be "D.U.I.
CONVICTED," initially seemed to offend Eighth Amendment notions of civility and dignity, but have been upheld. Id. But see People v. Letterlough, 86 N.Y.2d 259, 265-66, 26869, 655 N.E.2d 146, 149-51, 631 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108-10 (1995) (requiring "CONVICTED
DWI" bumper sticker as probation condition was beyond authority of court and served no
rehabilitative purpose); see also Artway v. Attorney Genl of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666
(D.N.J. 1995) (finding New Jersey sexual recidivist registration statute unconstitutional
under Ex Post Facto Clause and recognizing possible Eighth Amendment concerns), affid in
part and modified in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
109 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (holding death penalty unconstitutional); McLamore v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 934, 240 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting chain gang may violate Constitution).
110 See Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations for Sentencing Reform, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1077, 1080-81 (1992) (discussing frustration of judges imposing "retribution" sentences); see also J.S. Bainbridge, Jr., The Return of Retribution, 71 A.B.A. J. 60,
62 (1985) (noting retributive sentences arise out of judicial frustration); Douglas Dennis,
supra note 29, at 1 (noting America's "noble but frustrating endeavors' at prison
rehabilitation").
111 See 48 Hours, supra note 9 (discussing revival of Alabama's chain gangs); see also
Curriden, supra note 93, at 74 (reporting Alabama Corrections Commissioner Ron Jones'
opinion that chain gangs are effective against recidivism). Commissioner Jones commented
that "some people say it's not humane, but I don't get too much flack about it [from Alabama voters]." Id.
112 See ALA. CODE § 14-3-53 (1995) (corrections board authorizing shackling and chaining of prison inmates); id. § 14-4-2 (county to determine site where hard labor performed by
prison inmates); id. § 14-5-5 (country may assign convict to work in and around public
building or on county projects); id. § 23-1-37 (permitting highway work, construction and
maintenance); ARiz. REV. STAT. AN. § 283 (West) (requiring implementation of plan by
Dec. 1, 1995, requiring inmates to wear leg irons and work in chain gang teams).
113 See Curriden, supra note 93. Legislators in several states, including Tennessee, say
they are giving serious consideration to the introduction of chain gangs to their penal systems. Id.; see also 48 Hours, supra note 9 (reporting several states, Canada, and Britain are
considering chain gang punishment); Wade, supra note 75 (reporting proposed return to
chain gang advocated by Democratic candidates for Lieutenant Governor).
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comport with minimum constitutional standards,' 1 4 such as adequate medical care, access to counsel or a law library, proper sanitation, and recreation."15 Most states have statutory guidelines for
prison administration and maintenance of prisoners. 116 Thus,
while assignment to a chain gang may be the penalty for various
offenses, 11 7 it is now governed by sentencing and disciplinary
guidelines."" Modern chain gangs are not limited to male convicts" 9 and they may not be imposed upon sick or elderly prisoners.' 2 ° Further, they must reflect the racial composition of the
general population of that particular prison. 12 Prisoners are restrained by lightweight chains 1 2 2 which are attached only upon
114 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (noting basic necessities include food,
warmth, and exercise); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (finding deprivation
of "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" violates Eighth Amendment). In order to
be found unconstitutional, a punishment must deny a prisoner the basic necessities of life.
Id. In the context of prison, the Supreme Court has established these constitutional minima to be adequate food, shelter, medical care, access to counsel, and recreation. Id.; see
also supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (discussing basis and result of extradition
proceedings). Indeed, challenges to chain gangs in the past were detailed in extradition
proceedings. Id. Courts granted habeas corpus petitions brought under the Eighth Amendment or uniformly denied writs of extradition as a result of deplorable conditions of confinement under a totality of the circumstances analysis. Id.
115 See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304 (noting basic necessities include food, warmth, and exercise); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (finding "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" includes adequate food, shelter, medical care, access to counsel, and recreation).
116 E.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-88 (1994) (providing for inspection of jails and setting sanitation requirements); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951.23 (West 1995) (setting standards and requirements for detention facilities); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.600 (Baldwin 1995) (noting permissible conditions for correctional centers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 705 (West 1992)
(establishing standards for food and clothing of prison inmates); id. § 751 (West 1992) (setting health standards for prisons); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137 (McKinney 1987) (establishing
management program for correctional facilities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-33.1 (1992) (outlining prisoner control and quartering guidelines); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 192 (West 1995)
(establishing standards for jail inspections).
117 See Telephone Interview with Tom Gilkeson, supra note 11 (stating that minimumsecurity and medium-security prisoners as well as parole and probation violators may be
assigned to chain gang).
118 E.g., ALA. CODE § 14-3-53 (1994) (outlining guidelines for use of shackles and chains);
see Pounders v. State, 74 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954) (holding jail sentence coupled with
hard labor sentence to pay for court costs are two separate, permissible punishments (citing Bragan v. State, 95 So. 2d 123 (Ala. Ct. App. 1942)); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-7-30
(Law. Co-op. 1976) (restricting convict area to specific locations).
119 See ALA.CODE § 14-4-7 (1975) (prohibiting women from working "as a laborer on any
public highway in this state"); 1995 Iowa Legis. Serv. HF 215 (West) (stating hard labor
"shall be available to both male and female inmates").
120 See, e.g., 1995 Iowa Legis. Serv. HF 215 (West) (stating hard labor shall be "suited to
the inmate's age, gender, physical and mental condition").
121 See Telephone Interview with William Grey, supra note 74 (stating that although
greater percentage of prison population is African-American, "it's not black crime or white
crime").
122 See 48 Hours, supra note 9 (noting chains weigh approximately three pounds); see
also Dorman, supra note 11, at A7 (recounting interviews with chain gang members).
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arrival at a work site. 12 3 Prisoners are rewarded for compliance
with prison regulations with such privileges as television, better
work assignments, or accrued "good time."124 Most importantly,
prisoners have access to counsel, prisoners' unions, and the courts
1 25
to pursue available remedies for unconstitutional treatment.
Though some prisoners concede that the chain gang is an effective crime deterrent, 126 many also contend that some disturbing
similarities to old chain gangs remain. 127 Prisoners assigned to
modern chain gangs still complain of racial bias, slavery and cruelty. 128 Indeed, the very purpose of reinstating chain gangs-subsidization of the prisoner work system 2 9 as well as deterrenceare reminiscent of "convict leasing".13 ° Similarly, parole and probation violators 3 ' may be assigned to a chain gang with mini1 33
mum-security

prisoners1 3 2 and

medium-security

inmates,

123 See Bates, supra note 11, at 23 (discussing Alabama's reinstitution of chain gangs);
Telephone Interview with Tom Gilkeson, supra note 11 (confirming chains not attached

until convict's arrival at work site).
124 See Telephone Interview with Tom Gilkeson, supra note 11 (stating prisoners may
trade earned time on chain gang for "salary," reduced sentences, or shorter work shifts).
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing federal civil remedy for deprivation of prisoners' rights); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129-30
(1977) (discussing effectiveness of prisoners' union for addressing grievances); Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) (declaring civil rights action is proper vehicle to challenge constitutionality of prison conditions).
126 See, e.g., 48 Hours, supra note 9 (quoting inmate stating chain gang assignment
"would make me not want to come back here").
127 See Bates, supra note 11 (likening modern chain gang to abandoned punishment);
Robert Evans, Switzerland: UN Torture Body "Alarmed"at US Chain Gang Return, REuTER, May 4, 1995 (noting European objection to American chain gang particularly in light
of United States as signatory to Treaty on Torture and Punishment); Shackles of Shame,
supra note 12 (suggesting chain gangs should not be restored); 48 Hours, supra note 9
(quoting chain gang inmate claiming "it's a form of modern-day slavery").
128 See infra note 153 (quoting inmates complaining of slave-like treatment). See generally Parish, supra note 5 (claiming chain gang similar to slavery).
129 Telephone Interview with William Grey, supra note 74 (stating "cost is the ultimate
factor").
130 See generally supra notes 30 and 46 and accompanying text (describing "convict
leasing").
131 See Telephone Interview with Tom Gilkeson, supra note 11 (describing which prisoners are assigned to chain gang).
132 See Telephone Interview with Tom Gilkeson, supra note 11 (discussing composition
of chain gang); see also 48 Hours, supra note 9 (discussing security risks of chain gangs). An
unchained minimum security prisoner who escaped from a prison work gang abducted,
raped and murdered a woman. Id. However, "30-35% of the individuals locked up are minimum security non-violent" according to a commercial prison security company representative). Id.
133 See Telephone Interview with Tom Gilkeson, supra note 11. These medium-security
workers fall into two categories: prisoners who work on the prison grounds who are unchained but supervised by armed guards, and those performing public works projects who
are chained because of the higher risk of escape and risk to community safety posed by the
off-grounds work. Id.; 48 Hours, supra note 9 (explaining residents fear community work
because unchained worker once escaped and committed murder); see also Morrison, supra
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which may 4 actually create a greater risk of violence and
3
instability. 1
Prisoners' rights and standards of care and confinement, developed over the past thirty years, also give rise to new questions.1 3 5
The risk of harm1 36 created by the fact that convicts are tethered
by fifteen-foot chains presents new liability issues. 1 3 7 Risk of increased violence and hostility as a result of more austere conditions and degradation are also factors. 138 Significantly, the international community has suggested that the concept of American

note 65 (noting only prisoners whose age or health prohibits it are not assigned to the chain
gang).
134 See H.R. REP No. 2531, 1995 Fla. Laws (limiting chain gang work to minimum-security prisoners and prisoners never convicted of escape).
135 See Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (M.D. Ala. filed Sept. 19, 1995) (claiming modern chain gangs impose work-related injuries as well as impose cruel and unusual punishment). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (providing federal civil remedy for deprivation
of prisoners' rights); Jones v. North Carolina, 433 U.S. 119, 129-30 (1977) (discussing effectiveness of prisoners' union for addressing grievances); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
494 (1973) (declaring civil rights action is proper vehicle with which to challenge constitutionality of prison conditions); Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 91-93 (1952) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (supporting prison inmates' federal action to obtain review of unconstitutional
prison treatment).
136 See James, No. 95-T-637-N (Alabama chain gang class action claiming that tethering
prisoners together imposes risk of harm related to equipment, highway traffic, and discipline); Navarro, supra note 11 (outlining injury risk related to group chaining).
137 See, e.g., Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291, 1292-93 (9th Cir. 1994). The issue of
liability for injuries sustained while a prisoner is performing mandatory labor as part of his
sentence centers on whether the prisoner is an "employee" within the scope of applicable
statutes. Id. The court held that no contract existed between inmate and prison and that
convicts were not "employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 1293. Consequently, the prisoner was not entitled to minimum wage for his computer consulting work
done off premises. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Woodward, 452 S.E.2d 656, 658 (Va.
1995). The Virginia Supreme Court held that a prisoner laboring as a crew member was not
an employee within the meaning of Virginia's Workers' Compensation Act for an injury
sustained while trimming a tree next to a highway. Id. But see Allen v. New York, No.
77410 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1995); Gary Spencer, State Liable for Inmate's Work-Related Injuries,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 4, 1992, at 1 (discussing Allen case). The New York Court of Claims recently held New York State to a standard of absolute liability when an inmate was injured
in a work-related accident. Id.; Wolfe v. City of Miami, 134 So. 539, 539-40 (Fla. 1931). A
pedestrian recovered against a municipality when she was run over by a chain gang convict
driving an official vehicle at the behest of a guard. Id.
See James, No. 95-T-637-N; see also Nick Jackson, Internal Exile: A Proposal for a Federal System, 1990 DET. C.L. REv. 1085, 1117 (discussing risks posed by convict labor to
community); David Nadvorney, Inmate on Road Gang Was Not An 'Employee', NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 20, 1995, at B19. The class action recently commenced by Alabama chain gang prisoners asserts liability for future injuries due to Correction Department's failure to appreciate
the risk of injury from tools when men are chained together. Id.
138 See Newman v. Alabama, 466 F. Supp. 628, 634-35 (M.D. Ala. 1979). See generally
Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052, 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (discussing increased violence because of conditions of confinement); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1277 (S.D.
Tex. 1980) (discussing potential for prison violence in light of "intolerable conditions").
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chain gangs itself is contrary to established standards of humanity and decency. 139
III.

EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSis

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. 140 However, this prohibition is subject to broad and flexible interpretation,14 1 incorporating the elusive concepts of human dignity 1 42 and "evolving
standards of decency in a maturing society."'14 Further, the
Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to respond implicitly to
44
the vicissitudes of American society.1
139 See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text (discussing Trop's requirement that
international standards of decency be considered).
140 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). A punishment must be both
cruel and unusual to violate the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see also Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 967 (1991) (discussing distinction between "cruel" and "unusual").
141 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (holding "use of excessive physical
force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the
inmate does not suffer serious injury"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1981)
(stating Eighth Amendment analysis is not a "static test"); McLamore v. South Carolina,
409 U.S. 934, 935 (1972) (declaring that "delineation of just what conditions constitute
cruel and unusual punishment is not well defined"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(declaring Eighth Amendment derives meaning from changing decency standards of a progressive populace); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (explaining that
"cruel and unusual" is a progressive concept defined by "more enlightened" public); Spain v.
Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting language of Eighth Amendment is
general while its underlying principals remain constant permitting its standards to be imprecise); Commonwealth v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110, 115 (Pa. 1971) (noting cruel and unusual punishment "defies concrete definition").
142 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 229 (1976). The Court emphasized that
[Floremost among the 'moral concepts' recognized in our cases and inherent in the
Clause is the primary moral principle that the State, even as it punishes, must treat
citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity.
Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972)
(noting "Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the infliction of uncivilized and
inhuman punishments .... A punishment is 'cruel and unusual' therefore if it does not
comport with human dignity"); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 198 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that "[u]nderlying the Eighth Amendment is a fundamental premise that prisoners are
not treated as less than human beings").
143 See Spain, 600 F.2d at 200 (deciding whether conditions of confinement violate
Eighth Amendment requires application of"current and enlightened scientific opinion as to
the conditions necessary to insure good physical and mental health for prisoners"); Hendrick, 280 A.2d at 115, 117 (holding that unconstitutional punishment must be "so bad as
to be shocking to the conscience of reasonably civilized people" established by "more enlightened concepts of criminal justice"); see also Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1212
(5th Cir. 1977) (noting cruel and unusual punishment applies to conditions of confinement
as well as to specific acts against particular individuals).
144 See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351 (suggesting purpose of Eighth Amendment is to yield to
changing judgments of society). The Supreme Court noted that "[t]his Court must proceed
cautiously in making an Eighth Amendment judgment because, unless we reverse it, '[a]
decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be
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The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment has been applied to cases involving the death penalty, 1 45 sentencing proportionality, 1 46 and excessive force and corporal punishment by prison officials. 147 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has extended Eighth Amendment protection to prison conditions that were not part of the convict's original sentence. 148 In
reversed short of a constitutional amendment,' and thus '[revisions] cannot be made in
light of further experience'." (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171, 176); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. at 171. The Gregg Court explained that, "a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. Thus the Clause forbidding cruel
and unusual punishments is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("The Amendment embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . against which we must evaluate penal
measures."); Furman,408 U.S. at 268-69 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated
that:
The right to be free of cruel and unusual punishments, like the other guarantees of the
Bill of Rights, 'may not be submitted to vote; [it] depend[s] on the outcome of no elections.' 'The very purpose of a Bill of rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.'
Id. (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1138 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (noting "conditions that cannot be said to
be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional"). Contra
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-70, 379 (1989) (holding standards of decency to be
determined by objective data); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977)
(declaring that Eighth Amendment was intended to protect against "passions, or the reckless neglect, of the majority and its leaders").
145 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (discussing proportionality of
capital punishment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1983) (noting distinction in
death penalty case); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (noting cruel and unusual
punishment standard is different in capital punishment cases); Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40
(noting deference given in cases where punishment is death and declaring capital punishment unconstitutional).
146 See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (questioning proportionality requirement of Eighth
Amendment); Solem, 463 U.S. at 303 (considering whether imprisonment for non-violent
crimes was cruel and unusual punishment); Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (finding death
penalty under certain circumstances to be cruel and unusual punishment).
147 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 7 (1992) (holding use of excessive physical
force may be cruel and unusual punishment even if inmate does not suffer "serious injury");
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 312-13 (1986) (holding prison official's conduct must be
unnecessary and wanton under circumstances to violate Eighth Amendment).
148 See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 318-19 (stating "harsh conditions of confinement" may violate Eighth Amendment unless they are part of penalty imposed); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (holding conditions of confinement depriving prisoners of basic human
needs were unconstitutional); Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1126 (holding "totality of conditions" including inadequate medical care, overcrowding, inadequate security and supervision tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303, 1306 (5th
Cir. 1974) (concluding corporal punishment, and deprivation of basic elements of hygiene,
safety and medical care in conjunction with other deficiencies may rise to cruel and unusual punishment); Crain v. Bordenkircher, 342 S.E.2d 422, 426-27 (W. Va. 1986) (finding
inadequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety may constitute cruel and unusual conditions of confinement under a totality approach); Jeffrey D.
Bukowski, Comment, The Eighth Amendment and OriginalIntent: Applying the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments to PrisonDeprivation Cases is Not Beyond
the Bounds ofHistory and Precedent,99 DicK. L. REv 419, 419-20 (1995) (noting prohibition
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addition, cruel and unusual punishment need not be limited to the
physical; 149 psychological "pain," such as humiliation and degradation, is sufficient punishment to violate the Eighth Amendment. 15 0 A pending Alabama class action suit asserts that the similarity of the chain gang to slavery inflicts such psychological pain
upon African-American convicts.' 5 ' If successful, exemption of African-American prisoners on this basis, might lead to an Equal
Protection challenge by remaining Caucasian, Asian, and Hispanic chain gang prisoners
and necessitate abandonment of this
52
mode of punishment.

The revival of chain gangs as punishment has raised the spectre
of slavery' 53 and prompted charges of cruel and unusual punishagainst cruel and unusual punishment had been extended to deprivations not part of criminal sentence). But see State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, 186 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1972) (finding
merely unpleasant or harsh and restrictive conditions fail to establish unconstitutional
punishment).
149 See Hudson, 530 U.S. at 7 (holding "serious" injury not required to establish cognizable claim of cruel and unusual punishment); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 363-64 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding aggregation of prison conditions affecting inmate's "physical, mental and
emotional health and well-being" may be unconstitutional); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
102 (1976) (holding Eighth Amendment proscribes more than "physically barbarious punishments"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273-74, 281 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting punishment need not involve physical mistreatment or degrade human dignity and
such degradation in punishment could conceivably violate the Eighth Amendment); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.33 (1958) (discussing effect of expatriation as non-physical cruel
and unusual punishment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (acknowledging "exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflict bodily pain or mutilation");
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 565 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d
388, 393 (10th Cir. 1977)) (stating conditions inflicting needless physical or mental suffering violate Eighth Amendment).
150 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (recognizing Eighth Amendment prescribes more than
just "physically barbarous punishment").
151 See Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (M.D. Ala. filed Sept. 19, 1995) (Second
Amended Complaint at 9) (asserting that chain gang violates Fourteenth Amendment).
152 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section 1 states: "... No State shall.. . deny to any person
. the equal protection of the laws." See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1970) (declaring Equal Protection Clause applicable to prison inmates); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333, 333 (1968) (holding racial segregation of prison inmates unconstitutional); Giles v.
Henry, 841 F. Supp. 270, 286 (S.D. Iowa 1993) (finding single instance of disparate punishment within prison insufficient to support Equal Protection claim); Santiago v. Miles, 774
F. Supp. 775, 796-97 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating discrimination of prison inmates for housing,
employment, or discipline violates Equal Protection Clause); Sheldon Gelman, The Biological Alteration Cases, 36 WM. & MARy L. REv. 1203, 1301 (1995) (discussing application of
strict scrutiny to prisoner Equal Protection challenges); Jay P. Kesan and Stephanie L.
Teicher, Prisoners' Substantive Rights, 83 GEo. L.J. 1461, 1498 n.3032 (1995) (surveying
parameters of Equal Protection Clause to prison inmates).
153 See U.S. CONST. amend XIII (prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude except as
punishment of convicted criminals). But see Dipiano, supra note 29, at 176-78, 187 (proposing privatization of prisons to reduce costs of punishment but conceding "convict leasing"
evokes chain gang image). Some chain gang participants agree that the labor has the air of
slavery. Id.; see also Bates, supra note 11, at 23. One convict on an Alabama chain gang
says, "I know what my ancestors felt man." Id.; Dorman, supra note 11, at 7. "This is just
another form of slavery" stated one chain gang member. Id.
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ment.15 4 Historically, the chain gang itself was not constitutionally impermissible punishment.1 5 5 Neither restraint by chains nor
mandatory labor 156 has been held unconstitutional. 15 7 Restraint of
prisoners while performing mandatory work assignments is also
permissible.' 58 Chains are considered incidental to prison confineSee H.R. REP. No. 2531, 1995 Fla. Laws (limiting chain gang to minimum-security prisoners and prisoners never convicted of escape); Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (M.D. Ala.
filed Sept. 19, 1995) (claiming chain gangs impose unconstitutional punishment). Nevertheless, given the Supreme Court's declaration that punishment need not be physical
alone, the issue of slavery in our nation's history may support a cognizable claim that
chains constitute psychological pain for African-Americans. Id.
154 See Austin v. James, No. 95-T-637-N (M.D. Ala., filed Sept. 19, 1995). The class action suit is brought by the Southern Poverty Law Center on behalf of Alabama chain gang
inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Id. The suit alleges that chain gangs are "barbaric
and inhumane" and expose plaintiffs to a substantial risk of physical injury and death. Id.
It deprives the plaintiffs of one of the most basic human needs-reasonable safety. Id. at
Amended Complaint at 1.
There is no Thirteenth Amendment violation of the prohibition against involuntary servitude in the context of convicted prisoners. See Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304,
1305 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that prisoner convicted in court of competent jurisdiction
could be sentenced to forced labor consistent with Thirteenth Amendment); Draper v.
Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that sentencing legally convicted prisoner
to forced labor did not implicate Thirteenth Amendment); Robbins, supra note 35, at 604
(discussing alternatives to government-run prison facilities).
The issue of slavery may, however, support a cognizable claim that chains constitute
psychological pain for African-American citizens which approaches cruel and unusual punishment. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating
psychological pain may be so severe as to violate Eighth Amendment); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (expressing view that "severe mental
pain" may rise to level of cruel and unusual punishment). Justice Brennan went on to note
degradation as punishment might conceivably violate Constitution. Id. at 274. Expatriation, as was the punishment in Trop, was an example of degradation as punishment because it "necessarily involve[d] a denial by society of the individual's existence as a member
of the human community." Id.; see also Ernest Morris, Some Phases of the Pardoning
Power, 12 A.B.A. J. 183, 189 (1926) (noting that Arkansas governor Donaghey pardoned
396 prisoners in one day because he thought chain gangs "cruel").
155 See Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding chain gang
punishment constitutional against Eighth Amendment challenge); see also Louis B. Meyer,
North Carolina'sFair Sentencing Act: An Ineffective Scarecrow, 28 WAKE FoREST L. REv.
519, 523, 570 n.31 (1993) (discussing legality of early 20th century chain gang sentences
and suggesting they arise, in part, due to prison overcrowding).
156 See generally supra note 21 (discussing individual elements of chain gang).
157 See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.8 (1978) (stating Constitution does not
require every aspect of prison discipline to serve rehabilitative purposes).
158 See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 196-98 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit held
that handcuffs plus waist chain, leg manacles, and neck chains were excessive restraints
for all out-of-cell movement. Id. Modifying the judgment below, the Court expressly noted
that the use of neck chains was not unconstitutional under all circumstances. Id. The use of
other restraints was limited; mechanical restraints other than handcuffs were prohibited
unless defendant was violent, threatened physical, or was an escape risk. Id. The Court
concluded that prisoner movement outside the prison inherently presents such a threat. Id.
In fact, only chains used in combination with other restraints and other unconstitutional
conditions of imprisonment violate the Eighth Amendment and constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
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ment, serving the legitimate purpose of preventing escape.1 5 9
Rather, it is deplorable conditions of confinement 160 physical brutality, and humiliation that constituted unconstitutionally cruel
and unusual punishment 1 6 ' by violating "human dignity"-even
of criminals.
A.

Trop v. Dulles and InternationalConsiderations

Trop v. Dulles 1 62 addressed the role of philosophy and history in
interpreting the Eighth Amendment and expanded existing concepts of "human dignity."1 6 3 In Trop, an Army private was convicted of wartime desertion and sentenced to three years imprisonment at hard labor before being dishonorably discharged.1 64
Eight years later, he was denied a passport on the ground that he
had lost his citizenship pursuant to the Nationality Act of 1940,
1 65
which authorized expatriation of convicted wartime deserters.
159 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (stating restraints are reasonably related to state interest in security); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)

(noting difficulty of prison discipline and security permitting restraints to serve legitimate
purpose of preventing escape); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1137 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting
Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments "totally without penological justification");
Spain, 600 F.2d at 197 (discussing use of various restraints to prevent escape); 48 Hours,
supra note 9 (noting difficulty of escape when attached to four other men subject to armed
guards); CBS This Morning (May 26), supra note 75 (reporting Arizona Sheriff Arpaio cites
moving inmates to streets for work necessitates chaining for security purposes).
160 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 363 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating
unconstitutional conditions shock conscience of any reasonable citizen); see also Gates v.
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating present conditions of confinement in
prison threaten prisoner health, hygiene, safety and violate Constitution); Bates, supra
note 11 (criticizing conditions imposed upon chain gang inmates). See generally Morrison,
supra note 65, at A22 (discussing confinement conditions associated with chain gangs); 48
Hours, supra note 9 (discussing confinement conditions associated with chain gangs); Dennis, supra note 29, at 2 (stating chain gangs result in "horrific conditions"). Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 173 (1976).
161 Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1140 (noting effect of isolated conditions of confinement must be
considered in environmental context due to risk of exacerbation by other related conditions); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 363-64 (suggesting "cumulative impact of the conditions of incarceration" be considered). Contra Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1131-33 (9th Cir.
1981) (finding where one condition does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment it is
error to conclude aggregate conditions rise to cruel and unusual punishment and warrant
injunction).
162 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

163 Id. at 100-04 (stating Eighth Amendment basic concept is "dignity of man," its standards are not static, and are defined by "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910) (stating
Eighth Amendment "seems to express a great deal of humanity").
164 Trop, 356 U.S. at 87.

165 Id. at 88, 88 n.1 (citing Nationality Act of 1940 § 401(g), as amended 58 Stat. 4, 8
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8)).

1995]

PROMETHEUS REBOUND

251

In Trop, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment pro66
hibited the use of expatriation as punishment. 1
In determining the standard to be applied in assessing whether
a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual, the Trop
Court did not limit itself to American norms. 1 67 The Court, in Trop
explicitly considered international standards of punishment in its
Eighth Amendment analysis.16 Distinguishing the constitutional
and historic philosophy of the United States from the repressive
nations which imposed expatriation as punishment, 1 69 the Court
concluded that such punishment violated the principles of the
Eighth Amendment. 7 ° By reinstituting the chain gangs, the
United States now may join the minority of nations that employ
17 1
capital punishment and chain gangs.

166 Id. at 103.
167 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-103, 103 nn.35-38 (1958) (citing United Nations
standards).
168 See id. (citing international standards and United Nations surveys and noting only
two countries condoned denationalization as punishment in contrast to American constitutional prohibitions); see also Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1214 (5th Cir. 1977) (suggesting objective standards such as OSHA regulations may be considered to determine
"evolving notions of decency" including compliance with fire and sanitation codes); Adams
v. Indiana, 271 N.E.2d 425, 437 (Ind. 1971) (noting Trop's reliance on international standards to support its holding that capital punishment violates Eighth Amendment). But see
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 372-78 (1989) (noting statutory analogies, expert opinions and polls are not applicable to determine societal decency standards); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (finding generalized expert opinions not given as much
weight as determining public attitude when determining contemporary standards of decency); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (holding prohibition against "cruel and
unusual" punishments is not "fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
373 (1910) (noting "time works changes"); Rose, supra note 91 (suggesting chain gangs subject American prisoners to being "degraded in a public theatre of punishment"); Wade,
supra note 75 (reporting Indiana University Law Professor Alex Tanford stated that "it's a
primitive vengeance notion. .. ").
169 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-04.
170 Id. at 102-03.
171 See Adams, 271 N.E.2d at 439 (listing countries abolishing death penalty); see also
HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WoRLD REPORT 315 (1995) (citing United States capital punishment methods as violative of international norms). See generally AMNESTY INT'L, THE AMNESTY INT'L HANDBOOK 37-47 (Hunter House 1991) (discussing countries abolishing and
retaining death penalty); AMNESTY INT'L, WHEN THE STATE KILLs (Amnesty International
Pub. 1989) (outlining international standards and discussing international capital punishment guidelines).
See HUMAN RIHsS WATCH, supra note 171, at 315 (citing Burma chain gang as violating
international standards); Nick Rufford, Burma: Chain Gangs on the Road To Mandalay,
SUNDAY TnIMs (Rangoon), July 28, 1995. In Burma, prisoners working to reduce sentences
are shackled with iron rods while repairing a road to be completed for expected tourists.
Many consider the chain gangs a symptom of a "repressive state." Id.
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Although Trop contemplates the progression of society, 7 2 it also
seems to permit its regression by yielding to the vagaries of society. 173 Applying a systematic analysis of cruel and unusual punishment 174 the Court also reveals a tension between the Eighth
75
Amendment's elusive notions of decency and human dignity.

Civil rights groups assert that chain gangs violate international
law, which prohibits the degrading treatment of prisoners.' 76 The
United Nations Committee on Torture, 77 of which the United
American chain gangs
States is a signatory, has indicated that
78
may violate international conventions.1
172 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Eighth Amendment is defined by society's
"progress").
173 Id. Although Trop expressly states that cruel and unusual- punishment standards
are governed by a progressing society, it simultaneously acknowledges that these standards may change. Id. at 100-01.
174 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (holding "use of excessive physical
force against and prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the
inmate does not suffer serious injury"); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 312-13 (1986)
(holding prison official's conduct must be unnecessary and wanton to violate Eighth
Amendment); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 229 (1976) (declaring "the State, even as it
punishes, must treat citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human
beings"); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (explaining Eighth Amendment derives meaning from
changing decency standards of progressive populace); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
344, 378 (1910) (explaining that "cruel and unusual" is progressive concept defined by
"more enlightened" public); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1126 (Former 5th Cir. 1982)
(holding "totality of conditions" including inadequate medical care, overcrowding, inadequate security and supervision tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment); Spain v.
Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 200 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting underlying principles of Eighth
Amendment remain constant); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991)
(discussing proportionality of capital punishment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-90
(1983) (distinguishing death penalty from other modes of punishment); Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (noting cruel and unusual punishment standard differs in capital
punishment context).
175 See sources cited supra notes 140-42, 152. Inmates have likened being chained to
being reduced to animals or ancestral slavery. William Booth, Link to the Past; The Return
of Chain Gangs is Not About Hard Labor, L.A. Tnmds, Jan. 8, 1996, at El (reporting inmate
comparison of chain gang to chaining of dogs); Dana Wilkie, Punishment Bills Arise in
Assembly 2 GOP Members Seek Revival of Chain Gangs, Flogging, Paddling, SAN DIEGO
UNMON-TRn., Jan. 18, 1996, at Al (recounting American Civil Liberties Union charge that
chain gangs are degrading, treat "men like animals", and promote animal behavior on
release).
176 See Spain, 600 F.2d at 198; Bates, supra note 11, at 23. Courts have acknowledged
that chains may in fact be more degrading when convicts are amongst the civilian population. Id.; Telephone Interview with William Grey, supra note 74. However, counsel to Alabama Governor Fob James maintains that "the ACLU is out of step with reality in this
case." Id. Mr. Grey stated that chain gangs are designed to accomplish deterrence and that
"corrections should correct." Id.
177 See Status of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 as of September 1,
1994, 34 1.L.M. 349, 349 (1995) (listing signatory countries and noting United States is not
party to this treaty).
178 See Dorman, supra note 11, at A7; Evans, supra note 127 (noting United Nations
objection to American chain gang particularly in light of United States as signatory to
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Trop Test Redefined

Although the spirit of Trop was invoked continually as a preface
to Eighth Amendment analysis, 179 a divided Supreme Court recently redefined the contours of evolving civilization and societal
attitudes.' s0 In Stanford v. Kentucky,'' the Court rejected 8 2 the
international considerations of the Eighth Amendment articulated in Trop and suggested that American standards alone define
its contours. 183 Thus, the Supreme Court narrowed the flexibility
and scope of the Eighth Amendment implicit in Trop.'8 4 Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion, which held that sentencing juveniles to
death does not violate the Eighth Amendment, 8 5 outlined objective indicia for determining societal standards of decency.'8 6 The
Court acknowledged Trop's "flexible and dynamic" interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment 18 7 but noted that subjective, judicial
concepts of decency are not dispositive.' 8
The Court stated that the primary objective indicator in determining public sanction of a particular punishment is legislation
enacted by elected representatives which manifest the voice of the
electorate. 8 9 It expressly maintained that erratic application of
such laws carries little significance and fails to establish disapproval of a particular punishment. 90 Finally, Justice Scalia exTreaty on Torture and Punishment). The United Nations has expressed doubts that chain
gangs violate international conventions. Id.
179 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (citing Trop's notion that Eighth
Amendment "draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668 n.36 (1977) (noting
tradition of Supreme Court decisions interpreting Eighth Amendment refer to "evolving
standards of decency" declared in Trop).
180 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 367 n.1 (1989) (limiting definition of Eighth
Amendment scope to objective American standards).
181 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., joined in Part II by Rehnquist, C.J., White, O'Connor
and Kennedy, JJ.).
182 Id. at 369 n.1 (stating, "[wie emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency
that are dispositive, rejecting the contention . . . that the sentencing practices of other
countries are relevant").
183 Id.

184 Id.; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 84, 100-03 (1958) (discussing interpretative goal
of Eighth Amendment).
185 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).

186 Id. at 370-77.
187 Id. at 368, 379.
188 Id. at 379; see id. at 381 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (stating that statutory

analogies are useful in proportionality analysis); id. at 383, 385-86, 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting statutory similarities, application of laws, and expert opinions are useful guides and should be considered).
189 Id. at 370.
190 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989).
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plained that "other indicia, including public opinion polls, the
views of interest groups, and the positions adopted by various professional associations" are not conclusive in determining public
consensus. 19 1 The Court concluded that its role is to determine actual standards of decency rather than the ideal.' 9 2
If the Eighth Amendment is defined by changing concepts of de1 93
cency, which are manifested in fluctuating election results,
then the Eighth Amendment no longer serves as a bulwark ensuring that previously-established standards of cruel and unusual
punishment have meaning. 194 Rather, the states would ultimately
define the scope of the Eighth Amendment.' 9 5
C.

Tension Resolved By Changing The Rules?

To survive constitutional scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, conditions of imprisonment must meet minimal stan191 Id. at 373-80.
192 Id. at 379-80.
193 See Emily Calhoun, Voice in Government: The People, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHics &
PUB. POL'Y 427, 428-30, 439 (1994) (discussing representational government and tension
between electorate and elected); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARv. L. REV. 43, 65, 70 (noting duty of elected officials to "follow their consciences, not
slavishly obey public sentiment"); Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 689, 787, 790 (1995) (suggesting
majoritarian electorate fails to protect minority views); Mark Tushnet et al., Judicial Review and Congressional Tenure: An Observation, 66 TEx. L. REV. 967, 968, 971-72 (1988)
(discussing conflict between determining will of electorate and elected official voting personal conscience). See generally U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1994 271, 286-88 (114th ed. 1994). In 1992 the total

United States population was 255,458,000. Id. at 27, t.26. In that same year, 189,044,000
Americans were of voting age. Id. at 288, t.449. 55% of the voting age population voted in
the 1992 Presidential election. Id. at 271, t.427. 68% of those eligible to vote were registered; 61.3% of them actually voted. Id. at 287, t.448. As a result, President Clinton was
elected by 43% of the total vote, representing less than a majority of Americans. Ruy A.
TEI
mA,
THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER (Brookings Inst. 1992); Ruy A. TEEaIRA,
WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE: TURNOUT DECLINE IN THE UNrrED STATES, 1960-1984 (Greenwood Press 1987); Gary C. Jacobson, Campaign Finance and Democratic Control: Com.
ments on Gottlieb and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 369, 369-71, 376-78 (1989)
(noting conflicting allegiances posed by large financial contributors and dispersed majority
voters).
194 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 662 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing
need for sentencing consistency in death penalty cases); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
331 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating "an innovative punishment would probably be
constitutional if no more cruel than that punishment which it superseded"); Van W. Ellis,
Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill and the Death Penalty: PunishmentFull of Sound and Fury,
Signifying Nothing, 43 DUKE L.J. 87, 87 (1993) (noting Eighth Amendment serves as a
bulwark against cruel and unusual punishments).
195 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (declaring, "[iut is emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,....").
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dards. 1 96 To assert a cognizable claim, an inmate must have been
denied the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities"197 or
have been refused treatment for serious medical needs. 198
Supreme Court nullification of a punishment requires both an objective and subjective determination that the conditions rise to the
level of cruel and unusual punishment.199 Societal concepts of decency regarding prison inmates have narrowed. 20 0 Ultimately,
these changing concepts were manifested in the election of two
conservative Presidents, who changed the composition of the

196 See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994) (requiring showing that prison
official's acts denied petitioner "the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities"); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,9 (1992) (holding mere denial of "minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities" was insufficient and only "extreme deprivations" could sustain conditions-of-confinement claim); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (recognizing
that deprivation of "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" may be cruel and unusual punishment); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding lack of
space, ventilation, supervision and medical care to be "deplorable," violating Eighth
Amendment); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1138 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting harsh conditions
are commensurate with criminal penalty and not necessarily unconstitutional).
197 See McMillian, 503 U.S. at 25 (stating societal standards of decency are not violated
by "anything short of uncivilized conditions of confinement"); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347 (stating that "conditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional"); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 192 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding medical, nutritional and sanitary conditions that satisfies constitutional requirement); Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating provision of adequate food,
clothing shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety provided immunity from constitutional challenge under Eighth Amendment).
198 See McMillian, 503 U.S. at 9 (declaring deliberate indifference to "serious" medical
needs violated Eighth Amendment); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (stating
"deliberate indifference" to serious medical needs violated Eighth Amendment); Ruiz v. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" of
prisoners was proscribed by Eighth Amendment).
199 See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (requiring objective and subjective components to sustain
Eighth Amendment claim); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases: Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause-Treatmentof Prisoners, 106 HARv. L. REV. 220, 226 (1992) (reviewing requirements for conditions of confinement cases); Katherine L. Frazier, Comment,
Constitutional Law-Helling v. McKinney: Future Risks of Harm Actionable Under the
Eighth Amendment, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1479, 1484-85 (1995) (stating Wilson Court required both subjective and objective elements to prove conditions of confinement violated
Eighth Amendment); see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. In Rhodes, the Court suggested that
conditions of confinement must "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities" to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id.; Ruiz, 429 U.S. at 104. In
Ruiz, the Court held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's "serious medical needs"
constitutes cruel an unusual punishment. Id.; Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8, 24 (holding "extreme
deprivations are required to make out conditions-of-confinement claim."); Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court's holding "extreme deprivations" were required to sustain conditions-of-confinement claim under Eighth
Amendment).
200 See, e.g., 48 Hours, supra note 9. During this broadcast, an Alabama juror admitted
another Devil's Island should be created. Id.; see also Parish, supra note 5 (showing 75%
percent of Arizonans like idea of chain gangs).
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United States Supreme Court.2 ° ' An inherent dichotomy arises
when one considers the role of the Eighth Amendment as a protection against cruel and unusual punishments and its link to changing American attitudes.2 °2
Under the objective test of Stanford, °3 there can be little doubt
as to society's view, since many of the politicians who have supported the reinstitution of chain gangs successfully campaigned
on such a platform. 20 4 Given modern prison administrative guidelines, the legitimacy of chains when used to prevent escape, the
Thirteenth Amendment's provision that involuntary servitude
may be used to punish, combined with the Stanford retreat from
broad indicia of decency, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
hold chain gangs unconstitutional. 20 5 Nevertheless, it seems inconsistent to consider continually-shifting popular opinion when
the Constitution was intended as a bulkhead of fundamental protections.20 6 To subject constitutional interpretation to societal vicissitudes 2° v is a disturbing posture and contrary to the purpose of
the Eighth Amendment.20 8 Moreover, it is unclear whether a
spate of elections can accurately reflect a permanent philosophical
201 See Smith & Hensley, supra note 90, at 1112-13 (demonstrating change in composition of United States Supreme Court); Coyle, supra note 90, at C2 (stating former Presidents Reagan and Bush built "energized conservative majority" in Supreme Court).
202 See generally supra notes 14, 17-18, 21, 140-144, 172-178 and accompanying text
(discussing parameters and interpretations of Eighth Amendment).
203 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (outlining objective indicia).
204 See supra notes 5-12 (discussing politicians who successfully campaigned promising
harsher criminal punishments).
205 See IIA, IIB, and IIIB herein at 236-50, 253-55.
206 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). "The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is
itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS .... comprehending various precautions for the public security which are not to be found in any of
the State constitutions." Id.
207 See THE FEDERALST No. 49, at 317 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
"The passions, therefore, not the reason, of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the
reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government." Id.; THE FEDERALmST No. 10,
at 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of select group of elected officials expressing will of those they represent). But see
Bukowski, supra note 148, at 434-35 (suggesting court should defer to state legislatures to
establish imprisonment norms).
208 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 84, 100-03 (1958); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 8 (1992) (citing Trop's notion that Eighth Amendment "draws its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 668 n.36 (1977) (noting tradition of Supreme Court decisions interpreting Eighth Amendment refer to "evolving standards of decency" declared in Trop). See
generally Bukowski, supra note 148, at 420-22 (outlining historical goals of Eighth
Amendment).
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consensus by which to interpret Constitutional protections.2 °9
Rather, it may be likened to "reverse federalism,"21 0 which would
look to the individual states to determine the scope of constitutional interpretation. 2 1 '
An analysis of each element composing chain gangs as punishment suggests that they would pass constitutional muster as applied.2 1 2 Mandatory prison labor 2 3 and restraints used to enforce
discipline and prevent escape 2 14 are reasonable incidents of incarceration.2 1 5 Conditions of imprisonment are subject to external
regulation; prisoners have expanded remedies against constitutional infractions.2 1 6
209 See THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 196-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
"It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to encroach
upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to enis evident that all conjectures
croach upon the rights of the State governments .... [I]t
of this kind must be extremely vague and fallible ....Everything beyond [constitutionally delineated powers] must be left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as
they will hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped will always take care to
preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the general and the State
governments."
Id.; THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). James
Madison defined factionism as a "majority or minority... united by some [issue or] passion,
... adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of
the community."
210 See Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalizationof Criminal
Procedure, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1992) (defining reverse federalism); Sheldon H.
Nahmod, State Constitutional torts: DeShaney, Reverse-Federalism and Community, 26
RUTrGERS L.J. 949, 953, 955-57 (1995) (discussing ramifications of reverse federalism); see
also United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1637-39 (1995) (Kennedy and O'Connor, JJ.,
concurring) (tracing purpose of federalism); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1985) (discussing conflicts inherent in federalism).
211 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (stating primary objective factor in
determining public attitude are statutes passed by legislators they elect); see also supra
note 193 (discussing disparate results of majoritarian elections and less than majority
voter turnout).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 114-125 and 155-161 (discussing modifications to
modern chain gang practices consistent with constitutional parameters).
213 See Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga.) (stating mandatory work camp
assignment not per se inhuman, barbarous or tortuous punishment), affd, 393 U.S. 266
(1968).
214 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979) (stating that "Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without
more, constitute unconstitutional punishment even if they are discomforting.... ."); Spain
v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 196-99 (9th Cir. 1979) (neck chains and other mechanical restraints are not unconstitutional in all circumstances but may be used to prevent escape).
215 See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (declaring harsh conditions are
part of criminal sentence since "Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons").
216 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (". .. No State shall ...deny to any person.., the
equal protection of the laws."); ALA. CODE § 14-6-88 (1994) (providing for inspection of jails
and setting sanitation requirements); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 951.23 (West 1995) (setting standards and requirements for detention facilities); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.600 (Baldwin
1995) (noting permissible conditions for correctional centers); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 705
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CONCLUSION

Chain gangs were used to punish criminals and replace emancipated slave labor. Inadequate prisons and untrained supervision
transformed the chain gangs into an unconstitutionally inhumane
and abominable punishment synonymous with racial persecution.
Although chain gangs were never declared unconstitutional, they
are subject to constitutional and statutory mandates for each aspect as well as in the aggregate to prevent historic deterioration of
this punishment. This penalty, however, may produce consequences it is designed to prevent, since chain gangs may be dangerously dehumanizing to prisoners and may foster resentment,
hostility and, ultimately, violence.
Expanded rights and privileges of convicts once thought to reduce crime through rehabilitation, are yielding to the reclaimed
right of society to prevent crime through harsher punishments.
The resurrection of the chain gang thus seems to be an expression
of societal frustration and a regression contrary to the philosophical tradition of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court's rejection of international standards in defining human decency in
the context of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a departure
from the traditional American role as moral arbiter of human
rights and civil liberties. By forsaking traditional international
concepts of human rights, delegating constitutional interpretation
to the states, and permitting statistics to override foundational
analysis, the United States Constitution yields to the vagaries of
an intolerant society rather than a bulwark of human freedoms.
Consuelo Alden Vasquez

(West 1992) (establishing standards for food and clothing of prison inmates); id. § 751
(West 1992) (setting health standards for prisons); N.Y. CoRREcT. LAw § 137 (McKinney
1987) (establishing management program for correctional facilities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14833.1 (1992) (outlining prisoner control and quartering guidelines); OiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74,
§ 192 (West 1995) (establishing standards for jail inspections).
See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129-30 (1977)
(discussing effectiveness of prisoners' union for addressing grievances); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973) (declaring civil rights action is proper vehicle to challenge
constitutionality of prison conditions); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)
(declaring Equal Protection Clause applicable to prison inmates); Lee v. Washington, 390
U.S. 333, 333 (1968) (holding racial segregation of prison inmates unconstitutional); Santiago v. Miles, 774 F. Supp. 775, 796-97 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating discrimination of prison
inmates for housing, employment, or discipline violates Equal Protection Clause). See generally Kesan & Teicher, supra note 152, at 1461 (discussing substantive rights of prison
inmates).

